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 1 
 
 
Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? 
Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski 
 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg* 
Forthcoming in Case W. Res. J.L. Tech. & Internet (2011) 
 
In 1980, the Supreme Court gave a reassuring signal to the then-nascent biotechnology 
industry about the availability of patent protection for the fruits of its research when it upheld the 
patentability of a genetically modified living organism in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.1 Twenty-five 
                                                     
* Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I gratefully acknowledge 
the comments and suggestions of Robert Cook-Deegan, Pam Samuelson, and conference and workshop participants 
at the University of Leeds, University of Michigan Law School, John Marshall Law School, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law, and American University Washington College of Law. 
1 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Story of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY STORIES 327 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, eds., 2006). 
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 2 
years later, the Court seemed poised to reexamine the limits of patentable subject matter2 for 
advances in the life sciences when it granted certiorari in Laboratory Corporation v. 
Metabolite.
3
  But the Federal Circuit had not addressed the patentable subject matter issue in 
Laboratory Corporation, and the Court ultimately dismissed the certiorari petition as 
improvidently granted.
4
  Five years later, two pending cases in which the issue of patentable 
                                                     
2 ―Patentable subject matter‖ refers to the categories of inventions that might be patented, assuming the 
inventions meet the statutory standards for patent protection, as distinguished from those that are categorically 
excluded from the patent system because of the kinds of things they are.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).  If the invention is within patentable subject matter, the application still needs to be 
examined to be sure it meets the tests for novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010); utility, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2010); 
nonobviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2010); and adequate disclosure, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010). Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). But if the subject matter of the invention is categorically outside the patent system, the 
invention may not be patented even if it meets these other tests.  But cf. Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 
TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008) (arguing that judicial decisions that purport to rest on categorical exclusions from 
patentable subject matter may be better explained as involving patents that fail other standards for patent protection). 
3 Metabolite Labs. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Lab. 
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 546 U.S. 999 (2004).  
4 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 546 U.S. 999 (2005), cert. dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006). In both the initial grant of certiorari and  the dissenting opinion of three Justices from 
the subsequent decision to dismiss certiorari, the Justices focused on the question of whether the diagnostic method 
patent at issue improperly claimed ―a basic scientific relationship‖ that was categorically excluded from the patent 
system.  548 U.S. at 129 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the patent 
2
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 3 
subject matter has been fully litigated in the lower courts
5
 provide opportunities for the Court to 
resolve some of the uncertainties exposed in Laboratory Corporation. 
For the quarter century preceding Laboratory Corporation, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (―PTO‖), the courts, and the patent bar, had—for the most part—taken it for 
granted that new advances in biotechnology were patentable subject matter,6 and moved on to the 
details of applying patent law standards such as novelty,
7
 nonobviousness,
8
 utility,
9
 written 
                                                                                                                                                                           
claim is invalid on the ground that it improperly seeks to ‗claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship, … 
namely, the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency.‖). 
5 Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Mayo 
Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, 131 S.Ct. 3027 (2011);  Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
6 There were a few more issues to be worked out after Chakrabarty, such as the availability of utility patents for 
plants and animals. See Ex parte Allen, No. 86-1790, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1987 WL 123816 (B.P.A.I, Apr. 3, 
1987) (plants); J.E.M. Ag  Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (plants); In re Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 443, 1987 WL 71986 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985) (animals).  
7 See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the patent claims 
at issue were invalid because there were inherently anticipated by prior art). 
8 See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding the patent to be invalid because ―Deuel‘s 
claims 5 and 7 [which were] directed to specific cDNA molecules[,] would have been obvious in light of the applied 
references.‖); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming ―that appellants‘ claims [were] 
unpatentably obvious‖). 
3
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description,
10 
and enablement
11
 to biotechnology inventions.  Older precedents that might have 
called patentable subject matter into question,
12
 although never clearly overruled, had seemed 
destined to be lost in antiquity, as more recent decisions from the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit consistently overruled prior judicial exclusions from patentable subject matter.
13
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
9 See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding patent claims to be invalid because the 
claimed invention lacked specific and substantial utility). 
10 See Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the asserted 
claims were ―invalid for failure to meet the statutory written description requirement.‖). 
11 See Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, 188 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the claims at issue were 
―invalid as nonenabled‖); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the appellant‘s claims did 
not fail 35 U.S.C. § 112 because a person skilled in the art could make and practice the claimed invention without 
undue experimentation). 
12 See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) (holding patent claims on 
mixed culture of naturally occurring bacteria to be invalid).  For a review and analysis of these precedents, see 
Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility:Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 519 (2006) 
(discussing the limits of patentability) and Linda J. Demain & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Public 
Domain: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 303 
(2002) (discussing the scope and purpose of patent law in biotechnology). 
13 E.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that a 
computer-implemented accounting system for pooling assets from different mutual funds was patentable subject 
matter, rejecting arguments that this was a computer-implemented algorithm and a business method, and holding 
that patentable subject matter extended to anything that produces a ―useful, concrete, and tangible result‖); AT&T 
Corp. v. Excel Commc‘ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (―Because § 101 includes processes as a 
4
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The Supreme Court‘s renewed interest in patentable subject matter threatened to revive these 
aging precedents, disturbing the expectations of a patent-sensitive industry. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court finally reached the merits of a patentable subject matter 
dispute in Bilski v. Kappos,
14
 a case involving a business method
15
 rather than a diagnostic 
method.  Although the Justices were unanimous in concluding that the claims were not drawn to 
patentable subject matter, they differed in their reasoning.  Four Justices would have embraced a 
categorical exclusion for ―business methods‖16 but five Justices rejected such an exclusion as 
                                                                                                                                                                           
category of patentable subject matter, the judicially-defined proscription against patenting of a ‗mathematical 
algorithm,‘ to the extent such a proscription still exists, is narrowly limited to mathematical algorithms in the 
abstract.‖). 
14 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
15 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub. nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010). Specifically, Claim 1 of Bilski‘s patent application claimed: ―A method for managing the 
consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps 
of: (a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said 
commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical 
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer; (b) identifying market 
participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and (c) initiating a 
series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market participants at a second 
fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of 
said series of consumer transactions.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d  at 949 (citation omitted). 
16 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (Stevens, J. joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, J.J., concurring) 
5
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inconsistent with the statutory text.
17 
 All the Justices apparently agreed, however, that Bilski‘s 
claim fell within the Court‘s traditional exclusion of ―abstract ideas‖ from patentable subject 
matter.
18
  The Justices also agreed that the Federal Circuit had repeatedly erred in its 
interpretation of the Supreme Court‘s precedents on patentable subject matter:  first, by setting 
the bar too low under the ―useful, concrete and tangible‖ test from its 1998 decision in State 
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group
19
; and second, by setting too rigid a rule 
                                                     
17 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29.  Five Justices (Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, Thomas, and Scalia) rejected a 
―business methods‖ exclusion as inconsistent with 1999 statutory amendments to provide an infringement defense, 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1), for prior users of patented business methods, id. at 3228-29, while four of these 
Justices (not including Scalia) would also reject such an exclusion as outmoded in the ―Information Age,‖ id. at 
3229. 
18 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-30 (―[T]he Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of this Court's decisions 
in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, which show that petitioners' claims are not patentable processes because they are 
attempts to patent abstract ideas. Indeed, all members of the Court agree that the patent application at issue here falls 
outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract idea.‖); id. at 3235 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―Although I happen to 
agree that petitioners seek to patent an abstract idea, the Court does not show how this conclusion follows 
‗clear[ly],‘ [] from our case law.‖) (citation omitted). 
19 Compare State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the transformation of data constitutes ―a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, 
because it produces a ‗useful, concrete, and tangible result.‘‖), with Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231 (―[N]othing in today's 
opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
used in the past. See, e.g., State Street, []; AT&T Corp., [].‖) (citations omitted), and id. at 3232 n.1(Stevens, J., 
6
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in the ―machine-or-transformation test‖ as set forth in its 2008 en banc decision in In re Bilski.20 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court left it to the Federal Circuit to figure out the implications of 
Bilski v. Kappos for pending cases involving method claims from the biopharmaceutical 
industry.
21
   
                                                                                                                                                                           
concurring) (―[I]t would be a grave mistake to assume that anything with a ‗useful, concrete and tangible result,‘ 
State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. [], may be patented.‖). 
20 Compare In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (reaffirming ―that the machine-or-
transformation test, properly applied, is the governing test for determining patent eligibility of a process under § 
101.‖), with Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas, & Alito, JJ., and, in pertinent 
part, by Scalia, J.) (―This Court's precedents establish that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101. 
The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 
‗process.‘‖) ; id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsberg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, J.J., concurring) (―The Court 
correctly holds that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for what constitutes a patentable process; 
rather, it is a critical clue.‖). 
21 On the same day that it handed down its decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
vacated and remanded two such cases that the Federal Circuit had previously decided under its ―machine-or-
transformation‖ test. Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (claims patentable 
subject matter under machine-or-transformation test), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 130 S. 
Ct. 3543 (2010), on remand, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 
Fed. Appx. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (claims not patentable subject matter under machine-or-transformation test), 
rehearing denied, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24202 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case 
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010). 
7
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One case that was then pending before the Federal Circuit, Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
22
 involved challenges to product and process 
claims related to DNA sequences used in diagnosing breast cancer susceptibility.  Before the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the district court in Association for Molecular 
Pathology granted summary judgment of invalidity in favor of the challengers, invalidating 
claims to isolated DNA sequences encoding the breast cancer susceptibility genes BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, as well as claims to diagnostic methods involving the analysis of DNA samples for 
mutations in those genes.
23
  Many biotechnology firms hold patents with similar claims, creating 
enormous interest in the outcome of this case on appeal.
24
 Indeed, the biotechnology industry 
filed amicus briefs in Bilski v. Kappos alerting the Court to the implications the decision might 
have for existing biotechnology patents.
25
 
                                                     
22 No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 5, 2010) (amending Ass‘n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., Donald Zuhn, AMP v. USPTO – Briefing Update III, PATENT DOCS  (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/02/amp-v-uspto-briefing-update.html (containing links to most of the thirty amicus 
briefs that were filed in this case). 
25 See Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, Briefs: November 2009 – 2010 Term, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/publiced_preview_briefs_nov09.html#bilski 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (containing links to sixty-eight amicus briefs that were filed in the Supreme Court in 
Bilski v. Kappos). 
8
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Perhaps the Supreme Court concluded that the safest course was to decide Bilski in a way 
that sheds as little light as possible on pending biotechnology cases. The Bilski tea leaves have 
something to offer both challengers and defenders of biotechnology patents. Challengers may 
find support in the Court‘s renewed endorsement of historical nonstatutory exclusions of ―laws 
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas‖ from patentable subject matter and in the 
overarching directive to the Federal Circuit to look to Supreme Court precedents in elaborating 
patentable subject matter doctrine.
26
 Defenders of biotechnology patents may find support in the 
Court‘s disapproval of the Federal Circuit‘s rigid application of the ―machine-or-transformation‖ 
test as the sole test of patent-eligibility for processes,
27
 in its emphasis on the expansive statutory 
                                                     
26 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (noting that these exceptions are not required by statute, but ―they are consistent 
with the notion that a patentable process must be ‗new and useful.‘‖). 
27 The Court in Bilski did not reject the machine-or-transformation test entirely, but instead approved it as a 
―useful and important clue‖ that is not the sole test for determining patentable subject matter for processes.  Id. at 
3226-27. Both the USPTO and the Federal Circuit subsequently seized upon this ―clue‖ in reaffirming the centrality 
of the machine-or-transformation test in defining patentable subject matter.  See Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d 1347, 
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (―The Supreme Court's decision in Bilski …  rejected the machine-or-transformation test only 
as a definitive test … Thus, the Court did not disavow the machine-or-transformation test.  And, as applied to the 
present claims, the ‗useful and important clue, an investigative tool,‘ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., 
that the present claims pass muster under § 101.‖); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Memorandum from Robert W. 
Bahr, Acting Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corp, Regarding 
Supreme Court Decision in Bilski v. Kappos (June 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_28jun2010.pdf (―Examiners should continue to examine 
9
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text as the primary determinant of patentable subject matter,
28
 and in an explicit expression of 
concern from four Justices in Bilski about the impact of the machine-or-transformation test on 
the patentability of ―advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.‖29 
The majority‘s dual focus on the expansive language of the statutory text and on the stare 
decisis effects of its own more restrictive prior decisions sends mixed signals about the Court‘s 
own interpretive inclinations. It provides limited guidance for future decisions because it does 
not rest on any general principles that might inform analysis of future claims. Indeed, continuing 
in the tradition of the precedents it reaffirms, the Court offers no account of what function 
subject matter limitations serve in the patent system beyond reciting that patentable subject 
matter is ―only a threshold test.‖30 In the absence of an account of the function of this threshold 
test, one can only wonder why the Supreme Court has reached out to revive previously moribund 
limitations on patentable subject matter, and what work those limitations should be doing that 
distinguishes the threshold test from the further sorting that goes on in the course of examining 
                                                                                                                                                                           
patent applications with §101 using the existing guidance concerning the machine-or-transformation test as a tool for 
determining whether the claimed invention is a process under §101.‖).   
28 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (The Supreme Court has ―more than once cautioned that courts ‗should not read 
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.‘‖). 
29 Id. at 3227 (―As numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty 
as to the patentability of software [and] advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.‖) (Justice Scalia did not join this 
portion of the opinion). 
30 Id. at 3225 (―The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.‖). 
10
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claims that get beyond the threshold for patentability. Some commentators have suggested that 
most if not all of the Court‘s patentable subject matter precedents could be better understood in 
terms of other requirements for patent protection such as novelty, nonobviousness, or limitations 
on claim scope.
31
 In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court not only failed to offer clear guidance as to the 
boundaries of patentable subject matter, but also missed an opportunity to explain what 
patentable subject matter is about. 
In this article, I consider alternative accounts of the work that patentable subject matter 
doctrine might do for the patent system in the hope of clarifying the application of that doctrine 
to diagnostic method claims. I begin with a review of recent doctrinal developments to show that 
current patentable subject matter doctrine suffers from a lack of clarity not only as to what the 
applicable rules are, but also as to what those rules are supposed to accomplish. I then consider 
what it might mean for patentable subject matter to function, as it is sometimes described, as a 
―threshold test‖ of patentability that precedes a more in-depth examination for compliance with 
other statutory standards. Although such a threshold test might offer administrative benefits, 
                                                     
31 E.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 
622-23 (2009) (highlighting the Court‘s ability to restrict the patent system by using the obviousness doctrine); 
Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1115-18 (2007) 
(arguing that the courts and the Patent Office ―may be using § 101 rejections as proxies for other difficult questions 
of patentability and policy.‖); Risch, supra note 2. 
 
11
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current patentable subject matter doctrine cannot and does not function as a threshold test. I next 
consider what functions patentable subject matter doctrine might perform beyond the threshold 
that are distinct from the functions performed by other doctrinal standards for patent protection 
such as novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure. I conclude that patentable subject 
matter doctrine performs functions that are neither entirely distinct from these other doctrines nor 
redundant to them. Patentable subject matter doctrine leaves some aspects of new discoveries in 
the public domain and limits the scope of allowable claims in ways that might depart from 
limitations imposed by prior art and disclosure requirements. Although perhaps suggestive of 
prior moorings in public policy, existing doctrine provides minimal guidance as to how to use 
patentable subject matter doctrine to further the goals of the patent system. 
I. Revival of Subject Matter Exclusions 
Although §101 of the Patent Act
32
 defines patentable subject matter in broad terms to 
include ―any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,‖ a long 
line of judicial decisions recites additional exclusions from patent protection.
33
  In Bilski v. 
                                                     
32 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
33 The Supreme Court‘s recent interest in patentable subject matter has inspired a rich literature reviewing these 
exclusions. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject-Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
1353 (2010); Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract Idea,” 15 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011); John F. Duffy, supra note 31; Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility – A Disease 
and a Cure, 84 So. CAL. L. REV. 387 (2011). 
12
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Kappos, the Supreme Court characterized these non-statutory exclusions narrowly as ―three 
specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: ‗laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.‘‖34 Prior Supreme Court cases have sometimes recited the 
exclusions in different and more expansive terms, free of the narrowing qualifier ―specific.‖ For 
example, the Court has stated that ―a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not 
patentable invention,‖35 that ―patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of 
nature,‖36 that ―[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work,‖37 and that ―an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature.‖38 In addition 
to these broadly articulated exclusions, past judicial decisions and administrative practice seemed 
to recognize specific field exclusions from patentable subject matter for plants and animals,
39
 
medical and surgical techniques,
40
 business methods,
41
 and printed matter.
42
   
                                                     
34 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
35 Mackay Radio & Tel. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
36 Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
37 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
38 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). 
39 See Duffy, supra note 31 at 625-32 (exploring the ―[u]npatentability of plants and animals.‖). 
40 Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882-83 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (use of ether for anesthesia 
cannot be patented); Ex parte Brinkerhoff, No. 182, 24 Dec. Comm'r Pat. (1883) (Case No. 182), reprinted in 27 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 797, 798 (1945) (methods of treatment of diseases not patentable). 
13
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None of these limitations is apparent from the statutory language, and some that once 
looked like settled, black-letter law have subsequently been questioned if not entirely disavowed 
by the courts in more recent decisions.
43
  Most of the action has been in the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, although the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the patentability of living 
subject matter in decisions that broadly assert that patentable subject matter extends to ―anything 
under the sun that is made by man.‖44 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly invoked this language 
in decisions expanding patentable subject matter to include computer-implemented inventions
45
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
41 Lowe‘s Drive-In Theatres v. Park-In Theaters, 174 F.2d 547, 551-52 (1st Cir. 1949) (invalidating a patent for 
a terraced drive-in movie theater); Hotel Sec. Checking v. Lorraine, Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) 
(invalidating a patent for a bookkeeping register to prevent fraud in hotels and restaurants). 
42 In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (bank check and stub system); In re Reeves, 62 F.2d 199, 
200 (C.C.P.A. 1932) (chart to aid in appraising buildings); In re Russell, 48 F. 2d 668 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (system for 
indexing names in a directory) . 
43 See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-78 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (disavowing 
business methods exclusion); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (questioning ―legal and logical 
footing‖ of printed matter exclusion); Ex parte Scherer 103 U.S.P.Q. 107, 110 (B.P.A.I. 1954) (expressly overruling 
Brinkerhoff, supra note 40). 
44 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Congressional committee reports accompanying 
1952 Patent Act); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001) (holding that plants are 
patentable subject matter). 
45 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix, 958 F.2d 
1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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and business methods.
46
 This expansive approach reached a peak in State Street Bank & Trust v. 
Signature Financial Group and AT&T v. Excel Communications.  In these cases the Federal 
Circuit rejected the strictures of earlier decisions that had limited patentable subject matter to 
inventions that were ―tangible‖ in the sense of physical or material47 in favor of a broader 
standard that embraced anything that produces a ―useful, concrete, and tangible result.‖48  
The Supreme Court has never disavowed its own exclusions from patentable subject 
matter for laws of nature, products of nature, abstract ideas, and mental processes. But after 
upholding the patentability of a living organism in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and of a computer-
implemented method for calculating the cure time for molded rubber articles the next year in 
Diamond v. Diehr,
49
 the Court seemed to retire from policing the subject matter boundaries of 
                                                     
46 AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature 
Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
47 Compare Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059-60 (―These claimed steps of ‗converting‘, ‗applying‘, ‗determining‘, 
and ‗comparing‘ are physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into another.‖), with AT&T, 
172 F.3d at 1358 (―physical transformation‖ is not ―an invariable requirement, but merely one example of how a 
mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful application.‖). 
48 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373; AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1357. 
49 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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the patent system following the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1982.
50
  
After a long period of acquiescence
51
 in the expansive approach of the Federal Circuit, 
the Supreme Court surprisingly reached out to address the topic of patentable subject in 
Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite. The patent at issue in that case claimed a method of 
diagnosing vitamin deficiency by observing homocysteine levels and noticing whether they are 
elevated.
52
 The lower courts did not address whether the patent covered patentable subject 
matter,
53
 but the Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the question of whether the claims 
covered patentable subject matter or whether they impermissibly claimed a basic scientific 
relationship.
54
 This set off alarm bells in the biotechnology patent community because the claim 
                                                     
50 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
51 The one Supreme Court case to address patentable subject matter during this period approved the eligibility 
of plants for utility patent protection.  J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
52 The sole claim at issue recited: ―A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded 
animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an 
elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.‖ Metabolite Labs. v. 
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 999 (2004), cert. 
dismissed as improvidently granted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
53 Id. 
54 More specifically, the Court granted certiorari ―limited to question three as presented in the petition.‖  546 
U.S. 999.  Question three asked ―[w]hether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed, and nonenabling 
16
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at issue resembled many other patent claims on diagnostic methods that involve observing and 
analyzing a biological marker to make a diagnosis or to determine an appropriate course of 
treatment.
55
 A majority of the Court, perhaps figuring it was not appropriate for the Supreme 
Court to address such an important question of patent law without the benefit of the Federal 
Circuit‘s analysis, dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.56 However, three Justices 
thought the issue presented was ―not unusually difficult‖ and were therefore ready to invalidate 
the patent claims on subject matter grounds without waiting for the issue to percolate in the 
lower courts.
57
   
                                                                                                                                                                           
step directing a party simply to ‗correlat[e]‘ test results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific 
relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about 
the relationship after looking at a test result.‖  http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/04-00607qp.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2011). 
55 Kevin Collins calls such claims ―determine-and-infer claims.‖  See Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial 
Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of Intangibility, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 17, 2009), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/collins.intangibility.pdf; Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 S.M.U. L. 
Rev. 317, 323-42 (2007); Kevin Emerson Collins, The Irrelevance of Intangibility in Medical Diagnostic Patents U. 
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Kevin Emerson Collins, Rethinking Patent Eligibility: The 
Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy (working paper on file with the author). 
56 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006). 
57 Id. at 126 (Breyer, J. dissenting).  Although Justice Breyer is still on the Court, the two Justices who joined 
his dissenting opinion (Souter & Stevens, JJ.) have since retired. 
17
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The claim, according to the dissent, improperly sought to patent a basic scientific 
relationship between homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiencies, and was therefore 
unpatentable for the same reasons that preclude patenting e=mc
2
, the law of gravity,
 
or the heat 
of the sun.
58
 Clearly distinguishing patentable subject matter from other requirements for patent 
protection, the dissent justified the exclusion as a way to preserve free access to the ―basic tools‖ 
of scientific research:  
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that ―laws of nature‖ are 
obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary, 
research into such matters may be costly and time-consuming; monetary incentives may 
matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to 
the human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent 
protection can impede rather than ―promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,‖ the 
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection.
59 
The dissenting Justices feared that patents on fundamental scientific principles could 
discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example 
by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading 
them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending 
patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of 
using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.
60
  
The dissent recognized the difficulty of defining categories like phenomena of nature, 
mental processes and abstract intellectual concepts, but nonetheless concluded that the claim 
before them was not close to the boundary. They saw the correlation between homocysteine 
                                                     
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 126-27. 
60 Id. at 127. 
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levels and vitamin deficiency as a ―natural phenomenon,‖61 and it did not save the claim from 
invalidity that it was necessary to process a tissue sample in order to measure homocysteine 
levels.
62
 
Notably, it was a diagnostic method patent, rather than a business method patent, that 
brought the attention of the Supreme Court back to the issue of patent eligibility in Laboratory 
Corporation .  Although some diagnostic method patents have provoked controversy,
63
 business 
method patents have been far more controversial among legal scholars and economists.
64
 But 
                                                     
61 Id. at 134-35. 
62 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
63 See, e.g., Mildred C. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing 
Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3 (2003); Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test:  The Pitfalls 
of Patents Are Illustrated by the Case of Hemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577 (2002); Sirpa Soini et al., Patenting 
and Licensing in Genetic Testing: Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues, 16 EUR. J. HUMAN GENETICS 10 (2008). 
64 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577-1589 
(2003); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business? 16 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 263 (2000); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); David S. Olson, Taking the 
Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously:  The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 
181, 227-36 (2009); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent 
Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 92 (1999); Bronwyn 
H. Hall, Business Method Patents, Innovation and Policy, University of California, Berkeley Competition Policy 
19
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business methods are not basic tools of scientific research, and patents on business methods do 
not make a good poster child for the rhetorical moves and policy argument advanced by Justice 
Breyer for excluding patents on building blocks to leave room for further innovation. 
Although Laboratory Corporation created no binding authority,
65
 it sounded a warning to 
the Federal Circuit that its expansive approach to patentable subject matter might be vulnerable 
to reversal in an appropriate case. After a series of unanimous reversals of Federal Circuit 
decisions by the Supreme Court,
66
 the Federal Circuit seemed eager for an opportunity to address 
the issue of patentable subject matter ahead of the Supreme Court; it went so far as to ask for 
supplemental briefing on patentable subject matter in an appeal from a rejection on entirely 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Center Working Paper No. CPC03-39 (2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=463160 (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).  
65 See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1356 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (―Mayo, as did the 
district court, points to the opinion of three Justices dissenting from the dismissal of the grant of certiorari in Lab. 
Corp…. Again, with respect, we decline to discuss a dissent; it is not controlling law, and it involved different 
claims from the ones at issue here.‖). 
66 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008); KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 
U.S. 398, 427–28 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 741–42 (2002); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002); Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997). 
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different grounds.
67
 Meanwhile, the PTO and the lower courts resumed rejecting and invalidating 
claims for lack of patentable subject matter,
68
 renewing the flow of appeals and setting the stage 
for Federal Circuit and Supreme Court review.
69
  
The first of these cases to command both en banc attention of the Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court review on the merits was Bilski v. Kappos. Bilski‘s patent application claimed a 
method of hedging against risks of price fluctuations in commodities trading.
70
 The PTO Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the examiner‘s rejection for lack of patentable 
                                                     
67 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (―We do not reach the ground relied on by the Board 
below--that the claims were unpatentable as obvious … --because we conclude that many of the claims are ‗barred 
at the threshold by § 101.‘‖) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)). 
68 See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062; 86 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1705 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336 ( Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 
3543 (2010), on remand, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, Patent Application Publ‘n 
No. 2004/0122764, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, 2006 WL 5738364 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/fd022257.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2011) 
69 See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff‘d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Prometheus 
Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S.Ct. 3543 
(2010), on remand, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App‘x. 866 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S.Ct. 3541 (2010), on remand, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18126 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011); Research Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft, 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re 
Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007); . 
70 See Bilski, supra note 15. 
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subject matter.
71
The Federal Circuit had by this time affirmed rejections for lack of patentable 
subject matter in two other cases, using inconsistent analytical approaches.
72
 To clarify the law, 
the court ordered en banc review in In re Bilski.
73
 
Congress created the Federal Circuit in order to bring greater uniformity and 
predictability to the application of patent law.
74
 Mindful of that mandate, the Federal Circuit 
often prefers bright-line rules that point towards clear outcomes in future cases
75
 over broad, 
open-ended standards that require the exercise of judgment and on which reasonable minds can 
differ. But Supreme Court precedents on patent law, including its decisions about patentable 
                                                     
71 Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, Patent Application Publ‘n No. 2004/0122764, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, 
2006 WL 5738364 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006). 
72 Compare In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (method and system for mandatory 
arbitration involving legal documents not patentable because neither the Framers nor Congress intended patentable 
subject matter to include ―business systems … that depend entirely on the use of mental processes‖), with In re 
Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transitory watermarked ―signal‖ in digital audio file not patentable 
under textual analysis of categories set forth language of § 101). The Federal Circuit subsequently vacated and 
withdrew its opinion in In re Comiskey and revised its decision. 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
73 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
74 See generally Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 543 (2003). 
75 See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003); Arti K. Rai, 
Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 
1103-15 (2003). 
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subject matter, more typically state broad, open-ended principles.
76
 The Supreme Court had 
repeatedly faulted and reversed the Federal Circuit for applying unduly rigid rules that departed 
from the flexibility of its own precedents.
77
 This dynamic is apparent in Bilski. 
The Federal Circuit en banc majority attempted to unify the Supreme Court‘s previously 
announced subject matter exclusions and ―to clarify the standards applicable in determining 
whether a claimed method constitutes a statutory ‗process‘ under § 101.‖78  They began by 
                                                     
76 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
77 See, e.g., KSR Int‘l v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (―We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the 
Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court's engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an 
expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here.‖); Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (―It is true that the doctrine of 
equivalents renders the scope of patents less certain. It may be difficult to determine what is, or is not, an equivalent 
to a particular element of an invention. … These concerns with the doctrine of equivalents, however, are not new. 
Each time the Court has considered the doctrine, it has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the 
appropriate incentives for innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.‖).  
A notable counterexample is Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55, 67 n.11 (1998), in which the Supreme Court 
replaced the Federal Circuit‘s open-ended standard for determining whether an invention is ―substantially complete‖ 
based upon a ―totality of the circumstances,‖ as announced in Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co., 
103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) with a (perhaps) clearer standard of ―ready for patenting.‖ Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 
567. 
78 The majority opinion commanded the votes of nine of the twelve members of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). One judge wrote a separate concurrence, and three filed 
23
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blending the Supreme Court‘s categorical exclusions into one, characterizing the issue as 
―whether Applicants are seeking to claim a fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea) or a 
mental process.‖79 After a lengthy review of the Supreme Court cases, they concluded that: 
The Supreme Court… has enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process 
claim is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application of a 
fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle itself. A claimed process is 
surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.
80
 
Because Bilski‘s risk hedging method did not ―involve the transformation of any physical object 
or substance, or an electronic signal representative of any physical object or substance,‖ and 
because Bilski admitted failure to meet the alternative machine-implementation prong of the test, 
the court concluded that his claims did not qualify as patentable subject matter under the 
machine-or-transformation test and affirmed the rejection.
81
  
                                                                                                                                                                           
dissents. 545 F.3d at 966 (Dyk, J., concurring); 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting); 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, 
J., dissenting); 545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
79 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952.  This conflation is quite explicit.  The majority posits: ―As used in this opinion, 
‗fundamental principles‘ means ‗laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.‘ Id. at 952 n.5. 
80 Id. at 954 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
81 Id. at 963-64. 
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The machine-or-transformation test thus supplied a single bright-line rule for excluding 
all ―fundamental principles,‖ uniting the treatment of a claimed method of hedging risks in 
commodities trading with the treatment of e=mc
2
, the law of gravity, and the heat of the sun. 
This comprehensive rule threatened to exclude not only patents on risk-hedging methods, but 
also patents on methods of analyzing diagnostic markers.
82
  Indeed, shortly after the Federal 
Circuit en banc embraced the machine-or-transformation test in Bilski, a Federal Circuit panel 
relied on Bilski in summarily affirming a trial court decision invalidating a patent claiming ―a 
method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a 
chronic immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group 
of mammals.‖83 The trial court had held the patent invalid on the ground that it claimed a natural 
phenomenon. In a very brief opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed, but on the different ground 
that ―Dr. Classen‘s claims are neither ‗tied to a particular machine or apparatus‘ nor do they 
‗transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing.‘‖84 
                                                     
82 See Kevin Emerson Collins, The (Ir)relevance of Intangibility in Medical Diagnostic Patents, U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (on file with the author). 
83 Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98106, at *13 (D. 
Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App‘x. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated in part, and remanded, 130 S. 
Ct. 3541 (2010), on remand, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 (Fed. Cir. Aug 31, 2011).  See infra notes 181-205  and 
accompanying text. 
84 Classen Immunotherapies, 304 Fed. Appx. at 866.  The Federal Circuit did not consider claim language in its 
brief unpublished opinion, but at least some of the claims included as a step in the method ―immunizing mammals in 
25
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In Prometheus v. Mayo Collaborative Services, the Federal Circuit came out the other 
way, reversing a district court decision invalidating a patent on a ―a method of optimizing 
therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.‖85 Although 
the District Court had held the claims excluded from patentable subject matter because they 
recited ―mental steps‖ and ―natural phenomena,‖86 the Federal Circuit did not separately address 
these exclusions but instead used the machine-or-transformation test.
87
 Rather than reciting a 
purely diagnostic method, the Prometheus claims embedded a diagnostic step within a claimed 
method of optimizing treatment.
88
 Most of the claims included the steps of (1) administering a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens,‖ Classen Immunotherapies, 
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126, at *8, a step that triggers an (arguably transformative) immune response in the 
immunized mammals.  
85 Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reversing 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25062 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008)).  The Federal Circuit again reached the same decision through very similar 
reasoning on remand for reconsideration in light of Bilski v. Kappos.  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collab. 
Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. 
LEXIS 4764 (2011).  See infra notes  109-125 and accompanying text. 
86 Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1341. 
87 Id. at 1346 (holding that ―transformation … of the human body following administration of a drug‖ satisfied 
the machine-or-transformation test for a diagnostic method that involved administering a drug and measuring drug 
metabolites in a tissue sample). 
88 For example, U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 claim 1, which the Federal Circuit took to be representative of the 
independent claims at issue, reads: ―A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-
26
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drug to a patient and then (2) determining the level of metabolites in the patient‘s blood to 
determine whether the dose was too high or too low, but some claims did not recite the 
―administering‖ step.89 The Federal Circuit concluded that each of these two steps satisfied the 
machine-or-transformation test because (1) giving a drug to a patient causes transformation in 
the patient‘s body and (2) determining metabolite levels involves chemical assays that bring 
about physical and chemical changes in the patient‘s tissue samples.90 According to the Federal 
Circuit, these transformative steps were not merely incidental data-gathering, but were integral to 
the treatment regime.
91
 
 In both Classen and Prometheus, the Federal Circuit took its machine-or-transformation 
test to be entirely dispositive of the issue of patentable subject matter for the claimed methods, 
and did not consider whether claims to the analysis of biological markers might call for a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having 
said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject 
having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol 
per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a 
need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.‖ Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 
1340. 
89 Id. at 1347. 
90 Id. at 1346-47. 
91 Id. at 1348. 
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different analysis than claims to business methods. The machine-or-transformation rule did not 
find favor with the biopharmaceutical industry, and numerous amicus briefs filed with the 
Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos alerted the Court to the risks that rule posed for patents on 
diagnostic methods.
92
  
                                                     
92 See, e.g., Brief for Novartis Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_Pe
titionerAmCuNovartisCorp.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief for Caris Diagnostics as Amicus Curiae  Supporting  
Petitioners, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_Pe
titionerAmCuCarisDiagnostics.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief for The Univ. of S. Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting of 
Petitioners, 30 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_Pe
titionerAmCuUnivofSFlorida.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief of Adamas Pharm. and Tethys Bioscience as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent,  130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)  (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_964_Re
spondentAmCu2PharmCos.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief for Biotechnology Indus. Org. et. al as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_N
eutralAmCu4MedTechOrgs.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief for Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_N
eutralAmCuPhRMA.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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II. The Limited Guidance of Bilski v. Kappos 
The Supreme Court had no occasion to speak directly to the proper treatment of 
diagnostic method claims in its opinion in Bilski v. Kappos.
93
  There was little in the majority 
opinion that would provide even indirect guidance as to the patentability of any claims other than 
those at issue. The Justices all agreed that Bilski‘s claims were not patentable subject matter 
because they ―are attempts to patent abstract ideas,‖94 but they did not explain what that means. 
Although the Court insisted that the Federal Circuit‘s machine-or-transformation test is not the 
exclusive test for patentability of processes, they affirmed that test as ―a useful and important 
clue‖ without indicating when that clue might prove inadequate or misleading.95  Nor, for that 
matter, did they explain whether the machine-or-transformation test is ―a useful and important 
clue‖ in evaluating the patentability of inventions that are not processes,96 or of inventions that 
                                                     
93 See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text. 
94 See supra note 18. 
95 As noted supra at n.29 and accompanying text, four Justices expressed concern that ―the machine-or-
transformation test would create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine 
techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital signals.‖ 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.  The opinion went on to ―emphasize that the Court today is not commenting on the 
patentability of any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the 
Information Age should or should not receive patent protection.‖ Id. at 3228. 
96 The machine-or-transformation test, which the Federal Circuit in Bilski attributed to the Supreme Court, has 
its origins in cases involving the patentability of processes.  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) 
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are not ―abstract ideas‖ but that might fall within a different exclusion, such as products of 
nature, phenomena of nature, or mental processes. 
Nonetheless, the decision in Bilski v. Kappos alleviated some of the anxiety triggered in 
the biopharmaceutical patent community by the dissenting opinion in Laboratory Corporation v. 
Metabolite
97
 and by the en banc decision of the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski.
98
  Significantly, 
the Justices were unanimous in concluding that the machine-or-transformation test was not the 
sole test of patent-eligibility for processes, leaving room to argue that process patents involving 
the analysis of biomarkers might be patentable even if they do not pass the machine-or-
transformation test.
99
 To the extent that the Justices limited the use of that test, they seemed 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(―Transformation and reduction of an article ‗to a different state or thing‘ is the clue to the patentability of a process 
claim that does not include particular machines.‖); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877) (a ―process‖ is ―an 
act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or 
thing‖);. 
97 See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text. 
99 See William J. Simmons, Bilski v. Kappos: The U.S. Supreme Court Broadens Patent Subject Matter 
Eligibility, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 801, 805 (2010) (―the Court narrowly avoided a catastrophe for the biotech 
and pharmaceutical industry‖): Roy Zwahlen, BIO Commends Supreme Court for Expansive View of Patentability in 
Bilski Decision, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG. (June 28, 2010) 
http://patentlybiotech.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/bio-commends-supreme-court-for-expansive-view-of-
patentability-in-bilski-decision/ (―This ruling specifically states that the ‗machine-or-transformation test is not the 
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worried that it would exclude too much rather than too little.
100
 The rhetorical tone of the 
majority opinion in Bilski v. Kappos was more cautious than that of the dissenters in Laboratory 
Corp. v. Metabolite, emphasizing fidelity to statutory language and stare decisis and explicitly 
declining to adopt ―categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts.‖101 
For an industry seeking to preserve the patent-eligibility of its advances, a narrow opinion 
limited to the facts of Bilski v. Kappos was grounds for cautious optimism. 
 The post-Bilski decisions of the Federal Circuit reveal a divergence of views within that 
court as to the impact of Bilski on the revival of patentable subject matter exclusions set off by 
                                                                                                                                                                           
sole test for patent eligibility‘ and recognized that the lower court‘s ruling could have created uncertainty in fields 
such as advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.‖).   
100 This concern is most clearly articulated in portions of Justice Kennedy‘s opinion that Justice Scalia did not 
join and that therefore failed to command a majority of the Court. See, e.g, Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3227 (―The machine-
or-transformation test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating processes similar to those in the Industrial 
Age — for example, inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible form. But there are reasons to doubt 
whether the test should be the sole criterion for determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age. 
As numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to the patentability 
of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data 
compression, and the manipulation of digital signals.‖). 
101 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. 
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Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite. Two opinions authored by Judge Lourie
102
 make the most 
of the Supreme Court‘s qualified endorsement in Bilski of the machine-or-transformation test as 
an ―important clue‖ for distinguishing patent-eligible processes from abstract ideas.  These 
opinions apply that test to diagnostic method claims, notwithstanding concerns expressed by a 
plurality of four Justices about its appropriateness for ―advanced diagnostic medical techniques.‖ 
Under this approach the key to patent eligibility for diagnostic methods is a chemically 
transformative step recited in the claim language. Judge Lourie also looks to chemistry to define 
the scope of the exclusion from patentable subject matter for products of nature, holding that a 
claim to isolated DNA is patentable subject matter if isolation of the claimed material from its 
natural environment requires the breaking of ―covalent bonds.‖103  By reverting to the bright-line 
approach of the Federal Circuit‘s own en banc decision in Bilski, these opinions arguably curtail 
patentable subject matter further than the Supreme Court required when it rejected the machine-
or-transformation test as the ―sole test‖ of patent eligibility.104 
                                                     
102 Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Mayo 
Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4764 (2011); Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
103 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1352. 
104 Cf. CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claimed method for verifying the 
validity of an internet transaction invalid both under machine-or-transformation test and because process could be 
performed by human mentally or using pen and paper). 
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 Chief Judge Rader takes a different approach, reading the Supreme Court in Bilski as 
disapproving of non-statutory limitations on patentable subject matter, such as the machine-or-
transformation test, while directing the Federal Circuit to develop criteria for identifying 
unpatentable ―abstract ideas‖ that are not inconsistent with the statutory text.105  Eschewing 
bright-line rules, Judge Rader emphasizes that patentable subject matter is only a ―threshold test‖ 
that need not exclude every invention that is unworthy of a patent.
106
  Instead, before excluding a 
claim from patentable subject matter for abstractness, ―this disqualifying characteristic should 
exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter 
and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of 
the Patent Act.‖107 Under this minimalist approach to patentable subject matter exclusions, 
―inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are 
not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent 
Act.‖108 This approach, while responsive to the Supreme Court‘s admonition to honor the 
                                                     
105 Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft, 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen 
IDEC, Nos. 2006-1636, 2006-1649, slip op. at 13 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011) (additional views of Rader, C.J., joined 
by Newman, J.). 
106 Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 868. 
107  Id. at 868. 
108 Id. at 869.  See also Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (method of distributing content 
over the internet in exchange for viewing advertisements was patentable subject matter as a practical application of 
idea that advertising can serve as currency). 
33
Eisenberg:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2012
  34 
expansive statutory language of § 101, seems to ignore the Court‘s explicit rejection of the 
Federal Circuit‘s own previous ―useful, concrete and tangible‖ test for patentable subject matter 
from its 1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group.
109
 
A.  The Enduring Machine-or-Transformation Test 
The first opportunity to apply the teachings of Bilski v. Kappos to biopharmaceutical 
methods fell to Judge Lourie. On reconsideration of Prometheus Labs. on remand from the 
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit affirmed the continuing centrality of the machine-or-
transformation test as the primary determinant of patentability.
110
 Judge Lourie began the 
opinion for a unanimous panel
111
 by characterizing the patentable subject matter issue as whether 
the claims
112
 would ―entirely preempt‖ the use of a natural phenomenon, which would make 
them invalid under Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook, or whether they were drawn ―only 
to a particular application of that phenomenon,‖ as permitted by Diamond v. Diehr.113 He noted 
that the Federal Circuit‘s first decision in the same case had concluded ―that Prometheus' claims 
are drawn not to a law of nature, but to a particular application of naturally occurring 
                                                     
109 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
110 Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Mayo 
Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4764 (2011). 
111 Id. at 1349. The other panel members were Chief Judge Rader and Judge Bryson. 
112 See supra note 88. 
113 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1354. 
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correlations, and accordingly do not preempt all uses of the recited correlations between 
metabolite levels and drug efficacy or toxicity.‖114 Noting that the Supreme Court opinion did 
not ―disavow‖ the machine-or-transformation test, but rather characterized it as ―a useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are 
processes under § 101,‖ Judge Lourie concluded that ―as applied to the present claims, the 
‗useful and important clue, an investigative tool,‘ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, 
viz., that the present claims pass muster under § 101. They do not encompass laws of nature or 
preempt natural correlations.‖115 In other words, the panel found the same ―useful and important 
clue‖ that helped determine that the claims in Bilski covered ―abstract ideas‖ also useful in 
                                                     
114 Id. at 1355.  Although the Federal Circuit does not pinpoint where in its prior decision it analyzes the 
preemption issue, the prior decision pervasively conflates the question of preemption of a natural phenomenon with 
the machine-or-transformation test.  See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1349 (―The claims cover a particular 
application of natural processes to treat various diseases, but transformative steps utilizing natural processes are not 
unpatentable subject matter. Moreover, the claims do not preempt natural processes; they utilize them in a series of 
specific steps. … Regardless, because the claims meet the machine-or-transformation test, they do not preempt a 
fundamental principle. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (characterizing the machine-or-transformation test as ‗a definitive 
test to determine whether a process is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application of a 
fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle itself‘). The inventive nature of the claimed methods 
stems not from preemption of all use of these natural processes, but from the application of a natural phenomenon in 
a series of transformative steps comprising particular methods of treatment.‖) 
115 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1353-55. 
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discerning whether a claim is impermissibly drawn to laws of nature or preempts natural 
correlations; otherwise, the panel‘s conclusion would be a non sequitur.   
But the equivalence of ―abstract ideas‖ and ―phenomena of nature‖ is by no means self-
evident. ―Abstract idea‖ is an ambiguous term that the Supreme Court has regrettably left 
undefined.
116
 One understanding of the term ―abstract‖ is the opposite of ―concrete‖ or 
―tangible.‖117 The machine-or-transformation test may be a good proxy for this particular 
meaning of ―abstract,‖ but phenomena of nature are not necessarily abstract in this sense. 
Although abstract ideas and mental processes may be recognized by their intangible character, 
many natural phenomena (including the judicial litany of e=mc
2
, gravity, and the heat of the sun) 
bring about the transformation of matter from one state to another. Perhaps, then, we need 
another clue to separate out patentable applications of natural phenomena from the unpatentable 
phenomena themselves. 
The excluded category that seems most relevant to the Prometheus claims is ―mental 
processes.‖118  The Prometheus claims are an example of what Professor Kevin Collins calls 
                                                     
116 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract Idea”, 15 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 37, 53-60 (2011) (analyzing the possible meaning of ―abstract idea‖). 
117 Id. at 54. 
118 Cf. id. at 46 (arguing that Federal Circuit has improperly conflated the excluded categories of ―abstract 
idea‖ and ―mental process‖). 
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―determine and infer‖ claims.119  These claims involve determining a measurable medical fact or 
biomarker for an individual
120
 and then making an inference from the value of that biomarker 
about the individual‘s health or diagnosis.  The inference step may be what makes the invention 
useful, and perhaps what distinguishes it from the prior art.   
Consider the following claim at issue in Prometheus: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:  
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and  
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder,  
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red 
blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject and  
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red 
blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject.
121
  
The Prometheus opinion recognizes that the exclusion for mental processes might be a problem 
for those elements of the claim that recite diagnostic inferences, but concludes that the claim as a 
whole nonetheless recites patentable subject matter because it satisfies the machine-or 
transformation test:   
 We agree with the district court that the final ―wherein‖ clauses are mental 
steps and thus not patent-eligible per se. However, although they alone are not 
                                                     
119 See  supra note 55. 
120 E.g., Prometheus Labs., supra note 88. 
121 Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1340 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 claim 1 (filed Apr. 8, 1999)). 
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patent-eligible, the claims are not simply to the mental steps. A subsequent mental 
step does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of prior steps.  Thus, 
when viewed in the proper context, the final step of providing a warning based on 
the results of the prior steps does not detract from the patentability of 
Prometheus‘s claimed methods as a whole.  …  No claim in the Prometheus 
patents claims only mental steps.
122
 
This analysis stands in marked contrast to that of the dissenting justices in Laboratory 
Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories.
123
  The Laboratory Corporation 
claim also included transformative process steps to detect homocysteine levels, and the patent 
holder pointed to those steps in arguing that the claim was drawn to an ―application of a law of 
nature‖ rather than to the natural correlation itself, but the dissenting Justices were unpersuaded: 
Claim 13‘s process instructs the user to (1) obtain test results and (2) think about 
them.  Why should it matter if the test results themselves were obtained through 
an unpatented procedure that involved the transformation of blood?  Claim 13 is 
indifferent to that fact, for it tells the user to use any test at all. … [A]side from 
the unpatented test, they embody only the correlation between homocysteine and 
vitamin deficiency that the researchers uncovered.  In my view, that correlation is 
an unpatentable ‗natural phenomenon,‘ and I can find nothing in claim 13 that 
adds anything more of significance.
124
 
 Judge Lourie dismissed this analysis in a footnote to the Prometheus opinion, stating that 
―with respect, we decline to discuss a dissent; it is not controlling law, and it involved different 
claims from the ones at issue here.‖125 The panel might instead have distinguished Laboratory 
                                                     
122 Prometheus Labs.,628 F.3d at 1358. 
123 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
124 Id. at 136-38 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
125 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1356 n.2. 
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Corporation in ways that would have been more illuminating in future cases.
126
 That they did not 
even make the effort suggests, perhaps, that they no longer think the views of the dissenters 
could command a majority of the Supreme Court today.   
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories
127
 on the following question, as framed by Mayo in its petition: 
Whether 35 U.S.C. § 101 is satisfied by a patent claim that covers observed 
correlations between blood test results and patient health, so that the claim 
effectively preempts all uses of the naturally occurring correlations, simply 
because well-known methods used to administer prescription drugs and test blood 
may involve ―transformations‖ of body chemistry.128 
 
This framing packs into a single sentence at least three distinct issues, including (1) the relevance 
(and meaning) of whether observed correlations are ―naturally occurring,‖ (2) the relevance (and 
meaning) of whether the claim ―effectively preempts all uses‖ of the correlations, and (3) the 
relevance of whether the steps in the process relied upon to satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test—administering a drug and taking a blood test—are ―well-known.‖  A fourth 
                                                     
126 They might, for example, have considered whether it mattered that the diagnostic analysis set forth in the 
Prometheus claims was embedded in a treatment intervention, while the diagnostic analysis set forth in the 
Laboratory Corporation claim would cover observation and analysis of data from a patient who was not receiving 
any treatment. 
127 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4764 (June 20, 2011). 
128 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.  Prometheus Labs.,  (No. 10-1150), available 
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/10-01150qp.pdf. 
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issue is the relevance of the machine-or-transformation test to the patent eligibility of the claims 
at issue. 
 The first of these issues goes to the meaning of the exclusion for ―phenomena of nature‖ 
in the context of medical interventions. The petitioner‘s assertion that the correlation between 
observed levels of a drug metabolite and the need to adjust drug dosage is ―naturally occurring,‖ 
perhaps intended to revive the concerns of the Laboratory Corporation dissenters, points to the 
clearest ground for distinguishing the two cases. Even accepting that the correlation between 
homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiency was a ―natural phenomenon‖ that removed the 
Laboratory Corporation claim from patentable subject matter,
129
 the correlation recited in the 
Prometheus claim between drug metabolite levels and the need to adjust a patient‘s drug dosage 
poses a more difficult question. Vitamin deficiencies arguably arise in nature, but the 
Prometheus correlation is embedded in a therapeutic regimen that requires human intervention. 
If observations of the biological consequences of therapeutic interventions, and related 
inferences about the need to adjust those interventions, were to be excluded from patent 
protection, it would seem that the reason must lie outside the exclusion for ―phenomena of 
nature.‖  
                                                     
129 This assertion might not withstand close analysis.  Quite apart from the (entirely conventional) human 
interventions necessary to measure cobalamin levels, a diagnosis of ―vitamin deficiency‖ is itself a human construct, 
requiring human judgment as to what is normal and what is pathological.   
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 The second issue recalls prior Supreme Court cases invalidating claims that ―wholly 
preempt‖ use of an unpatentable claim element, such as a mathematical algorithm or a natural 
phenomenon, and that are thus deemed to claim the unpatentable element itself.
130
  Again, this 
issue might look different in the context of a purely diagnostic claim (such as that at issue in 
Laboratory Corporation) than it does in claims that embed a diagnostic step in a specific 
regimen for adjusting ongoing treatment (such as those at issue in Prometheus). A claim that is 
tied to a particular treatment regimen might not ―wholly preempt‖ a natural correlation between 
biomarker and inferred medical condition if the claim would not be infringed by substituting 
different biomarker values as indicators of a need to adjust the drug dosage, or by prescribing a 
different treatment for the same condition.  Every claim ―wholly preempts‖ the subject matter 
that it covers; the issue is how broadly one may claim a diagnostic inference.  One might further 
question whether itis fair to characterize a correlation between an observed biomarker and the 
inference of a need to adjust treatment as a natural phenomenon, or whether that correlation is 
more accurately understood as an artifact of human medical intervention.   
 The third issue concerns the fact that the novel contribution of the inventor—the mental 
step of inferring a need to adjust the drug dosage from observed values for a biomarker—is not 
patentable subject matter taken alone, as the Federal Circuit conceded.
131
  Some prior Supreme 
Court decisions have invalidated claims in which the value-added of the inventor beyond 
                                                     
130 See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
131  See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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unpatentable elements (such as a mathematical algorithm or a product of nature) is unworthy of 
patent protection in its own right; however, it has not always been clear whether the problem 
with these claims is lack of patentable subject matter or something else, such as obviousness or 
lack of novelty.
132
 The Laboratory Corporation dissenters dismissed as irrelevant to patent 
eligibility the fact that the diagnostic method claim before them included an assay step that 
required chemical transformation of a tissue sample through an unspecified (and unclaimed) 
process.
133
 Intuitively it may seem odd to rest the determination of patentable subject matter on 
the transformative character of incidental claim elements that do not otherwise contribute to the 
patentability of the invention.  But arguably the Supreme Court did just that in Diamond v. 
Diehr,
134
 when it affirmed the patent eligibility of a computer-implemented ―method of operating 
a rubber-molding press with the aid of a digital computer,‖135 over a vigorous dissent pointing 
out that the only patentable difference between the invention and the prior art was the use of an 
unpatentable ―algorithm‖ to calculate the rubber cure time.136  In Bilski v. Kappos the Supreme 
Court noted that patentable subject matter is only a ―threshold test,‖ and that inventions that pass 
that test must still meet other statutory requirements for protection, including novelty, utility, 
                                                     
132 See infra notes 245-252 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
134 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
135 Id. at 179 n. 5, 192-93. 
136 Id. at 193, 207-208 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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nonobviousness, and adequate description.
137
 Perhaps, then, the Court will affirm the Federal 
Circuit‘s approach of relying on physically transformative steps that are not themselves new or 
patentable to establish the patent eligibility of a method that relies upon non-transformative 
mental steps to meet the other requirements for patentability, thus leaving it to other doctrinal 
tools to reject or invalidate the claims for lack of novelty or for obviousness if appropriate.
138 
 
But if the machine-or-transformation test has more than talismanic significance as a clue to 
patent eligibility, perhaps it should not be so easily evaded by reciting in the claims conventional 
steps that do nothing to distinguish the invention from the prior art.
139 
  
 Rather than elaborating upon the machine-or-transformation test, the Court might instead 
seize the opportunity to clarify what it meant in Bilski v. Kappos when it disapproved of the 
Federal Circuit‘s reliance on the machine-or-transformation test as the ―sole test‖ of patent 
eligibility.
140
 Although explicitly acknowledging this directive from the Supreme Court, in 
practice some Federal Circuit panels and the PTO have used the machine-or-transformation test 
to the exclusion of other analytical approaches to identify patentable subject matter.
141
 If this is 
                                                     
137 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. 
138 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2010). 
139 Of course, new combinations of old elements may be patentable if the combination itself is not suggested in 
the prior art.   
140 See supra notes 20 and 27. 
141 The PTO directed examiners to continue using the machine-or-transformation test the day after the 
Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos.  See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Memorandum from Robert W. 
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not what the Supreme Court intended, it may need to be clearer about when use of the machine-
or-transformation test is inappropriate. 
 
Readers of Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in Bilski v. Kappos might suspect that what he (and 
the three Justices joining Part II.B.2 of his opinion)
142
 meant in stating that the machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for patentability is that while inventions that pass that test 
are patent-eligible subject matter, inventions that fail that test might get to take a different test: 
The machine-or-transformation test may well provide a sufficient basis for 
evaluating processes similar to those in the Industrial Age -- for example, 
inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible form. But there are reasons to 
doubt whether the test should be the sole criterion for determining the 
patentability of inventions in the Information Age. As numerous amicus briefs 
argue, the machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to the 
patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Bahr, Acting Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corp, Regarding 
Supreme Court Decision in Bilski v. Kappos (June 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_28jun2010.pdf (―Examiners should continue to examine 
patent applications for compliance with section 101 using the existing guidance concerning the machine-or-
transformation test as a tool for determining whether the claimed invention is a process under §101.  If a claimed 
process meets the machine-or-transformation test, the method is likely patent-eligible under §101 unless there is a 
clear indication that the method is directed to an abstract idea.  If a claimed method does not meet the machine-or-
transformation test, the examiner should reject the claim under §101 unless there is a clear indication that the 
method is not directed to an abstract idea.‖). 
142 Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3223 (The excerpt from Justice Kennedy‘s opinion set forth in text was joined by 
Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito, but not by Justice Scalia, who joined other portions of the opinion.). 
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inventions based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation 
of digital signals. … 
In the course of applying the machine-or-transformation test to emerging 
technologies, courts may pose questions of such intricacy and refinement that they 
risk obscuring the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions 
without transgressing the public domain. … As a result, in deciding whether 
previously unforeseen inventions qualify as patentable ―process[es],‖ it may not 
make sense to require courts to confine themselves to asking the questions posed 
by the machine-or-transformation test. §101's terms suggest that new technologies 
may call for new inquiries.
143
 
The Federal Circuit has sometimes persisted in applying the machine-or-transformation 
test to ―advanced diagnostic medicine techniques‖ even when it excludes such techniques from 
patent eligibility. Writing for a different Federal Circuit panel, Judge Lourie used the machine-
or-transformation test to invalidate diagnostic method claims in Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.
144
 In that case, the Federal Circuit reviewed a 
district court ruling
145
 issued after the Federal Circuit‘s embrace of the machine-or-
transformation test in In re Bilski and its first opinion in Prometheus v. Mayo, but before the 
Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos.  The district court held invalid multiple product and 
process claims related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 breast cancer susceptibility genes. A sharply 
                                                     
143 Id. at 3227-28 (citations omitted). 
144 Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (The panel included Judge 
Lourie, Judge Moore, and Judge Bryson.). 
145 Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2010). 
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divided Federal Circuit panel
146
 reversed the district court in part to uphold the validity of 
―composition of matter‖ claims to ―isolated DNA‖ molecules.147 However, the panel was 
unanimous in its analysis of the process claims. Each member of the panel joined Judge Lourie‘s 
opinion affirming the invalidity of claims to methods of comparing or analyzing human DNA 
samples to detect alterations or mutations indicating increased susceptibility to breast cancer
148
 
and reversing the district court to uphold the patent eligibility of a claim to a method of screening 
potential cancer therapeutics.
149
   
                                                     
146 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d 1329. Each member of the 3-judge panel wrote separately, with 
two judges concluding that the claims to isolated DNA were patentable subject matter, id. at 1333-34 (opinion of 
Lourie, J.); id. at 1358 (opinion of Moore, J., concurring in part);   id. at 1373 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (concluding that claims to BRCA genes and gene fragments were not directed to patentable 
subject matter). 
147 Id. at 1334 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 claim 1 (filed June 7, 1995)) (―An isolated DNA coding for 
a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 2.‖).  
148 E.g., id. at 1334 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 claim 1 (filed June 7, 1995)  (―A method for 
detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA1 gene, said alteration selected from a group consisting of the 
alterations set forth in Tables 12A, 14, 18, or 19 in a human which comprises analyzing a sequence of a 
BRCA1 gene or BRCA1 RNA from a human sample or analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from 
mRNA from said human sample with the proviso that said germline alteration is not a deletion of 4 
nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 4184-4187 of SEQ ID N0:1.‖). 
149 See id. at 1335 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 claim 20 (filed June 7, 1995)  (―A method for screening 
potential cancer therapeutics which comprises: growing a transformed eukaryotic host cell containing an altered 
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Judge Lourie‘s analysis of the method claims is a straightforward application of the 
machine-or-transformation test, which the district court had relied upon in holding these claims 
invalid.
150
 The panel held that the method claims to ―comparing‖ or ―analyzing‖ gene sequences 
―fall outside the scope of § 101 because they claim only abstract mental processes.‖151  The 
opinion rejected the argument that the method is patent eligible because it can only be performed 
after the prior steps of extracting DNA from a human sample and sequencing the BRCA DNA 
molecules in the sample, noting that the claim language does not include these prior steps.
152 
This 
allowed the court to distinguish the Prometheus claims, which included the ―transformative‖ 
steps of ―administering‖ a drug to a patient and ―determining‖ the levels of a drug metabolite in a 
patient.
153
 The opinion concluded that claims to methods of ―comparing‖ and ―analyzing‖ DNA 
sequences ―fail to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test, and are instead directed to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
BRCA1 gene causing cancer in the presence of a compound suspected of being a cancer therapeutic, growing said 
transformed eukaryotic host cell in the absence of said compound, determining the rate of growth of said host cell in 
the presence of said compound and the rate of growth of said host cell in the absence of said compound and 
comparing the growth rate of said host cells, wherein a slower rate of growth of said host cell in the presence of said 
compound is indicative of a cancer therapeutic.‖). 
150 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 at 
*147-61. Indeed, the district court had the Federal Circuit‘s first opinion in Prometheus before it and took pains to 
distinguish the two cases. Id. at *149-60. 
151 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1355. 
152 Id. at 1356. 
153 Id. at 1357.  See also supra notes 85-91. 
47
Eisenberg:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2012
  48 
abstract mental process of comparing two nucleotide sequences.  The claims thus fail to claim a 
patent-eligible process under § 101.‖154  
The panel also relied on the machine-or-transformation test as an ―important clue‖ to 
reverse the district court‘s holding of invalidity for a claim to a method for screening potential 
cancer therapeutics.
155
 The court noted that the claim recites the ―inherently transformative‖ 
steps of (1) ―growing‖ host cells transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene in the presence or 
absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, and (2) ―determining‖ the growth rate of the host cells 
with or without the potential therapeutic:  
The claim thus includes more than the abstract mental step of looking at two 
numbers and ―comparing‖ two host cells‘ growth rates. The claim includes the 
steps of "growing" transformed cells in the presence or absence of a potential 
cancer therapeutic, an inherently transformative step involving the manipulation 
of the cells and their growth medium. The claim also includes the step of 
―determining‖ the cells‘ growth rates, a step that also necessarily involves 
physical manipulation of the cells.
156
 
After this analysis of the method claims under the machine-or-transformation test, the opinion 
recites a litany of phrases from the patentable subject matter caselaw in support of its conclusion, 
including that ―the claim is not so ‗manifestly abstract‘ as to claim only a scientific principle‖ 
and that ―the claims do not preempt all uses of the natural correlations; they utilize them in a 
                                                     
154 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1357. 
155 Id. at 1357-58; see supra note 149 for the language of the claim. 
156 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d  at 1357. 
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series of specific steps.‖157 But it is the machine-or-transformation test that appears to do the real 
work for the panel of distinguishing between the unpatentable claims to methods of ―comparing‖ 
and ―analyzing‖ and the patent eligible claims to methods of screening potential cancer 
therapeutics. 
With the benefit of the Federal Circuit‘s opinion it would not be difficult to redraft future 
diagnostic method claims to recite patentable subject matter.  Using Prometheus Laboratories v. 
Mayo Collaborative Services and American Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO as 
guides, patent applicants could satisfy the machine-or-transformation steps by reciting as claim 
limitations transformative steps that necessarily precede any comparison of the value of a 
biomarker for a particular patient with a reference value. Consider, for example, claim 1 of U.S. 
Patent No. 5,709,999, held invalid under the machine-or-transformation rule: 
 A method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA1 gene, said 
alteration selected from a group consisting of the alterations set forth in Tables 
12A, 14, 18, or 19 in a human which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 
gene or BRCA1 RNA from a human sample or analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 
cDNA made from mRNA from said human sample with the proviso that said 
germline alteration is not a deletion of 4 nucleotides corresponding to base 
numbers 4184-4187 of SEQ ID N0:1.158 
The downfall of this claim is that it begins with the mental step of ―analyzing‖ a sequence 
without reciting the prior steps necessary to obtain and process a tissue sample in order to have a 
                                                     
157 Id. at 1358. 
158 U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 claim 1 (filed June 7, 1995). 
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sequence to analyze. Compare claim 46 of U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, which the Federal Circuit 
approved as claiming patentable subject matter in Prometheus:  
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy and reducing toxicity associated 
with treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
…. 
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine or 6-methylmercaptopurine in a 
subject administered a drug selected from the group consisting  of 6-
mercaptopurine,  azathiop[u]rine, 6-thioguanine, and 6-methyl-mercaptoriboside, 
said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x10
8
 red 
blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x10 
8
 red 
blood cells or a level of 6-methylmercaptopurine greater than about 7000 pmol 
per 8x10 
8
 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said subject.
159
 
The Federal Circuit saw the analytical inferences in the ―wherein‖ clauses of this claim as 
unpatentable mental steps, but the ―determining‖ step set forth prior to those clauses was a 
transformative step that satisfied the machine-or-transformation test and saved the claim from 
invalidity. If that is all it takes, it would seem that Claim 1 of the ‘623 patent could likewise be 
saved by inserting explicit claim steps of ―obtaining a DNA sample from a patient‖ and 
                                                     
159 U.S Patent No. 6,355,623 claim 1 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); Prometheus Labs, 628 F.3d at 1349 (―[W]e again 
hold that Prometheus‘s asserted method claims are drawn to statutory subject matter, and we again reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity under § 101.‖). 
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―determining the BRCA1 or BRCA2 DNA sequence in the patient‘s DNA‖ immediately before 
the word ―analyzing.‖160 
It is by no means clear that this is what the Supreme Court had in mind in approving the 
machine-or-transformation test as a ―useful clue‖ but not the ―sole test‖ of the patent eligibility 
of processes. Prior decisions have sometimes found similar claims-drafting maneuvers 
inadequate to avoid an exclusion from patentable subject matter, insisting, for example, that the 
transformative claim element should be disregarded when it amounts to ―insignificant post-
solution activity‖161 or mere ―data-gathering steps.‖162 Even if the Court is generally disposed to 
recognize patent eligibility for ―advanced diagnostic medical techniques,‖ it might not be 
satisfied with identifying a claims-drafting maneuver that works for future patent applicants, but 
leaves current holders of claims drafted in ―determine and infer‖ format with disappointed 
expectations. 
Concern for the disappointed expectations of patent holders may have played a decisive 
role in the divided panel‘s analysis of the patentability of composition of matter claims to 
isolated DNA, an issue on which the Supreme Court opinion in Bilski v. Kappos offers little 
                                                     
160 Prometheus Labs, 628 F.3d at 1350. 
161 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-192. 
162 E.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (―The sole physical process step in Grams' claim 
1 is step [a], i.e., performing clinical tests on individuals to obtain data. … The presence of a physical step in the 
claim to derive data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory.‖). 
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guidance.
163
 The United States as amicus curiae did not defend the PTO‘s longstanding practice 
of allowing patents to issue on isolated DNA molecules, but instead urged the Federal Circuit to 
affirm the District Court‘s holding that these claims were unpatentable products of nature.164  
                                                     
163 The Court in Bilski was not concerned with the patentability of products of nature and did not include 
―products of nature‖ in its list of time-honored exclusions from patent eligibility.  On the other hand, the Court cited 
with approval its own prior decisions in cases recognizing such an exclusion. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (―Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and 
inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.‖); Funk Bros. 
Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (Mixed culture of naturally occurring strains of bacteria selected 
for their non-inhibition of each other‘s function was not patentable subject matter because ―[i]t is no more than the 
discovery of some of the handiwork of nature …. The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change 
in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. …. Their use in combination does not 
improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided, and act quite 
independently of any effort of the patentee.‖); J. E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001) 
(citing with approval the above-quoted passage from Chakrabarty);  Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 
U.S. 1, 11-13 (1931) (Orange rind treated with borax to protect against decay was not sufficiently changed from its 
natural state to constitute a patentable ―manufacture‖ because ―[a]ddition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does 
not produce from the raw material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or 
property.‖). 
164 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party in Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology 
v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853320, available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/genepatents-USamicusbrief.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).  
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Nonetheless, Judge Lourie and Judge Moore both noted that such a departure from longstanding 
practice should come from Congress rather than from the courts.
165
   
The main disagreement among the panel members concerned whether segments of DNA 
that have been isolated from chromosomes but are otherwise unaltered are unpatentable products 
of nature. For Judge Lourie, human intervention to cleave the covalent bonds that unite the DNA 
molecule to other genetic material in its natural state is enough to make the isolated DNA 
molecules ―markedly different [with a] distinctive chemical identity and nature [] from 
molecules that exist in nature,‖ making the claims patent eligible.166 Judge Moore, however, read 
the precedents as requiring that the isolated molecule must do more than ―serve the ends nature 
originally provided,‖ and that human modifications must give the product ―markedly different 
characteristics with the potential for significant utility‖ in order to avoid the exclusion for 
products of nature.
167
  Judge Moore concluded that short DNA molecules isolated from 
chromosomes meet this standard because they could be used as primers and probes for diagnostic 
testing, but that longer DNA sequences that are unsuitable for these uses present a more difficult 
question.
 168  
Nonetheless, given the longstanding practice of the PTO to allow patents on isolated 
                                                     
165 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1354-55 (Lourie, J.); id. at 1367-68, 1370-73 (Moore, J., 
concurring in part) 
166 Id. at 1351 (Lourie, J.). 
167 Id. at 1359-60 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted). 
168 Id. at 1365-67. 
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DNA, Judge Moore concluded that the longer sequences were also patentable subject matter, 
noting concern for the impact of a contrary decision on the settled expectations of the 
biotechnology industry.
169
  Judge Bryson dissented from the holding of patent eligibility for 
isolated DNA, reasoning that, notwithstanding the breaking of chemical bonds, the isolated 
genes are not ―materially different‖ from the same genes as they occur in nature. 170 
The variety of claims at issue, the sharp disagreements among the panel members, and 
the care taken in each opinion to be faithful to precedent provide a strong foundation for 
Supreme Court review.  
B. The Minimalist ―Coarse Filter‖ Approach 
 Other post-Bilski patentable subject matter opinions from the Federal Circuit suggest a 
different approach, assigning a minimal role to subject matter exclusions reminiscent of the pre-
Laboratory Corporation era in the Federal Circuit. The first of these opinions was authored by 
Chief Judge Rader in Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft,
171
 shortly before the 
second Federal Circuit decision in Prometheus v. Mayo. Judge Rader, who also joined Judge 
Lourie‘s opinion as a member of the Prometheus panel, set an entirely different tone in writing 
                                                     
169 Id. at 1366-70. 
170 Id. at 1373, 1375 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
171 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
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for the Research Corporation panel.
172
 That case involved an invention in the longstanding 
patent eligibility battleground of information technology – specifically, a new method for 
allowing computers and printers to more efficiently render approximations of an image using 
digital halftoning technology.
173
   
 Judge Rader began by noting that patentable subject matter is only a ―threshold test,‖ and 
that the statute directs primary attention to the other conditions and requirements for 
patentability.
174
  He mentioned the ―machine or transformation‖ test only to recognize that the 
Supreme Court had faulted that test as ―nonstatutory.‖175  Turning to the question of whether the 
claimed processes were excluded from patentable subject as ―abstract,‖ Judge Rader did not seek 
clues to the meaning of that term, but saw its ambiguity as empowering the Federal Circuit to 
minimize the exclusion: 
The Supreme Court did not presume to provide a rigid formula or definition 
for abstractness. … Instead, the Supreme Court invited this court to develop 
―other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not 
inconsistent with its text.‖ …With that guidance, this court also will not presume 
to define "abstract" beyond the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic 
should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of 
                                                     
172 Id. at 862 (The panel consisted of Chief Judge Rader and Judges Newman and Plager.). 
173 Id. at 862-63. 
174 Id. at 868. 
175 Id.  
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eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs primary attention on 
the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.
176
 
Explaining why ―this court perceives nothing abstract in the subject matter of the processes 
claimed,‖ Judge Rader noted the ―functional and palpable applications‖ of the process, and 
observed that ―inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the 
marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and 
framework of the Patent Act.‖177 The opinion notes in passing that some of the claims require a 
―high contrast film,‖ ―a film printer,‖ ―a memory,‖ and ―printer and display devices‖ and that 
these features ―also confirm this court's holding that the invention is not abstract.‖178 But Judge 
Rader does not dwell on these physical elements or use the words ―machine or transformation‖ 
to explain their relevance.
179
  The discussion of patentable subject matter concludes by noting 
that claims that ―pass the coarse eligibility filter‖ might still fail the tests of claim definiteness 
and written description and that § 112 of the Patent Act
180
 might be a more appropriate way to 
invalidate claims that are not clear and concrete rather than a subject matter exclusion.
181
  
                                                     
176 Id. at 868. 
177 Id. at 868-69. 
178 Id. at 869. 
179 Id. at 868-69. 
180 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010) (outlining the extent to which claims must be specified). 
181 Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 869. 
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 This minimalist approach to the role of § 101 appears again in the analysis of 
biopharmaceutical method claims in the recent decision of the Federal Circuit in Classen 
Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC on remand from the Supreme Court.
182
  Prior to the Supreme 
Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the Federal Circuit had affirmed summary judgment of 
invalidity for the patent claims under the machine-or-transformation test in a brief opinion.
183 
  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Bilski.
184
 The three opinions from a divided panel on remand reveal sharp divisions both on the 
role of patentable subject matter doctrine and on its application to the claims at issue.  None of 
the opinions embraces the machine-or-transformation test. 
 Judge Newman, joined by Chief Judge Rader, found the claims of two of the three 
patents at issue patent-eligible under § 101, although questioning whether the same claims would 
survive challenges to their validity based on other statutory requirements, but affirmed the 
judgment of invalidity as to the claims of a third patent.
185
  Regrettably, the invalidity analysis 
for the third patent rests on a questionable reading of the claim language, as Judge Moore 
                                                     
182 Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, Nos. 2006-1634, 2006-1649, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011). See also supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (prior history). 
183 Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App‘x. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
184 Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC,  130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010). 
185 Classen Immunotherapies, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 at *44. 
57
Eisenberg:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2012
  58 
explains in an emphatic dissent.
186
  Judge Rader wrote separately in an opinion joined by Judge 
Newman to inveigh against ―a rising number of challenges under 35 U.S.C. § 101‖ and to 
implore the court to ―decline to accept invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility.‖187    
Although expressing profound skepticism toward ―judge-made‖ restrictions on patent eligibility, 
Judge Rader attributes the problem to ―litigants‖188 rather than to the Supreme Court and does 
not enter into an analysis of how the Court‘s precedents apply to the claims at issue in Classen. 
 As Judge Newman explains, the patents arise from Dr. Classen‘s discovery that 
administering the first dose of a vaccine prior to 42 days of age substantially decreases the 
likelihood of chronic immune-mediated disorders.
189
 The two patents that Judge Newman deems 
patent-eligible (the ‘139 patent and the ‘739 patent) claim a method of immunizing subjects by 
first ―screening‖ information about the occurrence of chronic disease in patients who have been 
immunized according to different immunization schedules, ―comparing‖ the results, 
                                                     
186 Id. at *51, *53-54, *55 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting) (―I am perplexed by the majority's suggestion that 
this claim ‗is directed to the single step of reviewing the effects of known immunization schedules,‘ Maj. Op. at 20, 
as the claim clearly requires immunizing mammals and then comparing the results to the known group …. The '283 
patent claim clearly and unequivocally requires the physical act of immunization and it is unfair of the majority to 
analyze  the claim for § 101 purposes as though it did not have that step.‖). 
187 Id. at *45 (additional views of Rader, C.J., joined by Newman, J.). 
188 Id. at *45 (―The language of § 101 is very broad.  Nevertheless, litigants continue to urge this court to 
impose limitations not present in the statute.‖) 
189 Id. at *5 (majority opinion). 
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―identifying‖ the lower risk immunization schedule, and then ―immunizing‖ patients according 
to the schedule that shows a lower risk of chronic immune-mediated disorders.
190
 The third 
patent (the ‘283 patent), according to Judge Newman, omits the final step of immunizing patients 
and  ―claims the idea of comparing known immunization results that are, according to the patent, 
found in the scientific literature, but does not require using this information for immunization 
purposes.‖191 In other words, the ‘139 and ‘739 patents claim methods that include first 
comparing the results of studies to figure out the lower risk schedule and then immunizing 
patients according to that schedule, while the ‘283 patent does not require actually immunizing 
patients and may be infringed merely by reading study results. 
                                                     
190 Id. at *5-6. 
191 Id. at *25.  This interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the language of the claim, which explicitly calls 
for immunizing patients in a trial in order to determine the lowest risk immunization schedule: ―A method of 
determining whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated 
disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of mammals, which comprises immunizing 
mammals in the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said 
immunization schedule, and comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic immune-
mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group, with that in the control group.‖ 
Id. at *8-9.  According to Judge Newman, ―The ‗immunizing‘ in the '283 patent refers to the gathering of published 
data, while the immunizing of the '139 and '739 patent claims is the physical implementation of the mental step 
claimed in the '283 patent.‖  Id. at *25. 
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 Given these claim interpretations, the results Judge Newman reaches would be easy to 
justify under the machine-or-transformation rule in reliance on Prometheus v. Mayo and 
Association for Molecular Pathology, but she instead looks primarily to Judge Rader‘s opinion in 
Research Corporation for guidance. She invokes Research Corporation repeatedly for the 
principles that § 101 is a ―coarse eligibility filter,‖ that other substantive conditions and 
requirements are available to weed out patents that are too vague or indefinite or conceptual, and 
that inventions with applications in the marketplace are unlikely to be so abstract that they are 
excluded from the broad reach of the statute.
192
   
Under this approach, Judge Newman concludes that the ‘139 and ‘739 patents pass the 
threshold of patentability because they are ―directed to a specific, tangible application, as in 
Research Corporation.‖193 That application is ―lowering the risk of chronic immune-mediated 
disorder.‖194  Although she notes that the claims include ―the physical step of immunization on 
the determined schedule,‖ she does not purport to apply the machine-or-transformation test. 
Instead she invokes ―the guidance of Bilski v. Kappos that ‗[r]ather than adopting categorical 
rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts,‘ exclusions from patent-eligibility 
should be applied ‗narrowly,‘‖ and notes that the claims ―raise cogent questions of patentability‖ 
                                                     
192 Id. at *21-24. 
193 Id. at *24. 
194 Id. 
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that are better resolved under the substantive requirements for patentability.
195
 Turning to the 
‘238 patent, Judge Newman asserts that it would be infringed merely ―by reviewing information 
on whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-
mediated disorder‖ without ―the subsequent step of immunization on an optimum schedule.‖196 
She concludes that the claims ―do not include putting this knowledge to practical use, but are 
directed to the abstract principle that variation in immunization schedules may have 
consequences for certain diseases‖ and are therefore too abstract to get past ―the coarse filter of § 
101.‖197 She mentions the machine-or-transformation test only to explain the Supreme Court‘s 
disapproval of it as the ―sole test‖ of patent eligibility and to summarize Classen‘s arguments for 
patent eligibility.
198
 
Two difficulties with this analysis make it problematic as an explanation for the decision.  
First, as noted previously, the ‘238 patent claim language, contrary to Judge Newman‘s account, 
appears to require immunizing research subjects: 
A method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects the 
incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group 
of mammals, relative to a control group of mammals, which comprises 
immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses 
of one or more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and 
                                                     
195 Id. at *24. 
196 Id. at *25. 
197 Id. at *25-28. 
198 Id. at *13, *26, *29. 
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comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic 
immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in the 
treatment group, with that in the control group.
199
 
That Judge Newman would attempt the difficult sleight of hand necessary to read this 
limitation out of the claim language suggests that the transformative step of bringing about 
bodily changes by administering treatment to a mammal in fact does matter to her assessment of 
patent eligibility, notwithstanding her avoidance of the label ―machine-or-transformation‖ or 
other ―categorical rules.‖  
Second, if we take Judge Newman at her word that what matters is not chemical 
transformation in the bodies of immunized mammals, but the practical application of the lower-
risk immunization schedule, then it is not clear why a method of determining whether an 
immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of chronic immune-mediated disorders 
fails that test. In biopharmaceutical fields, many patents cover inventions useful in drug 
development that do not recite steps of administering the as yet undiscovered drugs to patients. 
In fact, the one claim that was unanimously upheld by the panel in Association for Molecular 
Pathology—the claim to a method of screening potential cancer therapeutics—did not recite a 
step of administering the effective compounds to patients.
200
  Presumably, Judge Newman does 
not mean to call into question the validity of these patents, yet it is unclear that they would pass 
                                                     
199 Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283 claim 1 (filed May 31, 2995). 
200 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334. 
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the test of ―practical use‖ that purportedly distinguishes the patent-eligible from patent-ineligible 
claims in Classen.  
In dissent, Judge Moore argues that, properly interpreted, the claims of the ‘238 patent 
are indistinguishable from those of the ‘139 and ‘739  patents for § 101 purposes,201 and that all 
of them improperly claim fundamental scientific principles: 
Having discovered a principle – that changing the timing of immunization 
may change the incidence of chronic immune mediated disorders –Classen now 
seeks to keep it for himself. In the '283 patent, he accomplishes this goal by 
claiming the use of the scientific method to study the incidence of chronic 
immune mediated disorders. This preempts the field of study, and prevents any 
investigation into any immunogen, known or unknown, and to any disease, known 
or unknown, over any period of time. Where, as here, a patent preempts an idea, a 
basic building block of science, within a field of study, the patent in practical 
effect is a patent on the idea itself. 
202
 
Judge Moore repeatedly quotes Justice Breyer‘s dissent in Laboratory Corporation in 
arguing that allowing claims of the sort at issue would interfere with the development of further 
knowledge.
203
 Like Judge Newman, Judge Moore does not dwell on the machine-or-
transformation test. For Judge Moore the inclusion in the claims of a claim step of immunizing 
patients, whether subsequent to a comparison of immunization schedules as in the ‘139 and ‘739 
patents or prior to that comparison as in the ‘238 patent, could not transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process; in the former case the immunizing step was ―nothing more 
                                                     
201 Classen Immunotherapies, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 at *51, *53-57, *54  n.1. 
202 Id. at *60-61 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)).. 
203 Id. at *61, *63. 
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than post-solution activity‖ and in the latter case it was ―nothing more than a data gathering 
step.‖204 Distinguishing Prometheus v. Mayo, she notes that the Prometheus court concluded that 
the claims in that case ―were not merely data gathering steps or insignificant post-solution 
activity‖ and that because they were limited to the administration of specific drugs, they did not 
―preempt broadly the use of any natural correlation,‖ and faults the majority for failing to 
consider the preemptive sweep of Classen‘s claims.205 She rejects the majority‘s view that it was 
necessary to consider the substantive conditions for patentability in order to invalidate these 
claims: 
When, as here, the claims so clearly offend the constitutional imperative to 
promote the useful arts, where they preempt all application of a principle or idea, 
it is entirely appropriate to hold them unpatentable subject matter before reaching 
anticipation, obviousness, or any other statutory section that might also prove 
invalidity.
206 
 
In sum, the patentable subject matter cases decided by the Federal Circuit since the 
Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos reveal considerable disagreement within that court 
about the limitations of patentable subject matter and about the role those limitations should play 
in determining what may be patented. Without further clarification from the Supreme Court, 
some members of the Federal Circuit seem ready to return to the pre-Bilski machine-or-
transformation rule, while others seem ready to roll the clock back even further and return to the 
                                                     
204 Id. at *62. 
205 Id. at *53. 
206 Id. at *66. 
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―useful, concrete, and tangible‖ rule of State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group.207 Yet if 
the Justices agreed on anything about the contours of patentable subject matter in Bilski v. 
Kappos, it was that both of these positions get it wrong. 
III. Identifying the Purpose of Subject Matter Boundaries 
The Supreme Court has directed the Federal Circuit to consult the statute and Supreme 
Court precedent in elaborating rules of patentable subject matter, but the task of extrapolating 
from these sources to address unresolved issues is challenging without more clarity as to the 
purposes and functions of subject matter boundaries in the patent system. The majority opinion 
in Bilski v. Kappos avoids reference to any policy moorings that might either guide the 
interpretation of prior decisions or steer courts in future cases. But without understanding what 
patentable subject matter boundaries are supposed to accomplish, it is difficult to figure out 
where those boundaries belong. 
Earlier judicial opinions have advanced policy arguments in favor of exclusions from 
patentable subject matter that overlap with policies served by other doctrinal limitations on what 
may be patented, inviting the argument that patentable subject matter is redundant to these other 
limitations.
208
 For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly justified exclusions of 
―fundamental principles,‖ ―abstract ideas‖ and ―mathematical algorithms‖ by invoking concerns 
                                                     
207 See supra note 13. 
208 See Risch, supra note 2; Duffy, supra note 33. 
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about allowing unduly broad patent rights.
209
 But patent law addresses this concern elsewhere by 
limiting the allowable scope of patent claims to exclude prior art
210
 and nonenabled 
embodiments.
211
 Indeed, some of the older precedents date back to a time before the statute 
explicitly distinguished ―patentable subject matter‖ from other doctrinal limitations on the 
allowance of patents, making it difficult to map the basis for those decisions onto modern 
doctrinal categories.
212
 
Commentators have stepped into the void, producing a rich and varied scholarly 
literature. Some scholars find unarticulated normative intuitions lurking behind the boundaries 
laid down in prior decisions and seek to guide courts, Congress, and the PTO to use subject 
matter boundaries to ensure that the patent system continues to advance similar normative goals 
today.
213
 Some see the boundaries as failed attempts to lay down rules that have inevitably 
                                                     
209 E.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68, 72 (1972) (―Here the ‗process‘ claim is so abstract and 
sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion …. [T]he patent would 
wholly preempt the mathematical formula and, in practical effect, would be a patent of the algorithm itself.‖); see 
also Collins, supra note 33, at 50-53 (discussing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853)). 
210 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2010). 
211 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010). 
212 E.g., Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948) 
213 E.g., Olson, supra note 64 (arguing that until recently courts deployed patentable subject matter to exclude 
categories of invention that did not require patent incentives, using an implicit but unarticulated economic analysis 
to determine which fields would exhibit public goods problems that would lead to underproduction of inventions in 
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become outmoded in the face of technological change, preferring other doctrinal tools for 
identifying what is and is not patentable that offer more flexible standards and have proven more 
stable over time.
214
 Some attempt to disaggregate the limitations on patentable subject matter in 
order to sharpen and distinguish criticisms that apply to some parts of the doctrine but not 
others.
215
 Some take the boundaries as given and try to identify interpretive moves that will 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the absence of patents, and that under that analysis business methods should be excluded); Yu, supra note 33 
(arguing that patentable subject matter should ensure that patents advance Constitutional goal of promoting progress 
of science and useful arts by excluding basic tools of scientific and technological work, distinguishing invention 
from discovery, and defining subject matter boundaries consistent with industrial policy). 
214 See Duffy, supra note 33, at 614 (arguing that over time clear ―rules‖ restricting patentable subject matter 
have proven unstable in the face of technological change relative to more flexible ―standards,‖ and that other patent 
law ―standards,‖ such as nonobviousness and enablement, better address concerns about excessive patenting than 
rigid exclusionary rules); Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information 
Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 356 n.5 (2003) (―Adjustments in patentable subject matter standards frequently 
follow changes in technological knowledge. These adjustments are needed to maintain patent incentives as 
inducements for design efforts and disclosures in new technological realms.‖). 
215 Chiang, supra note 33 (distinguishing two kinds of patentable subject matter limitations that present 
different costs and benefits: (1) categorical exclusions, which trade off administrative cost savings against the costs 
of over- and under-inclusiveness; and (2) scope limitations, which are more costly to administer but less prone to 
error); Duffy, supra note 33 at 614 (distinguishing patentable subject matter ―rules‖ from ―standards‖). See also 
Collins, supra note 55 (arguing that the focus on the machine-or-transformation test has led to miscoding of 
determine-and-infer claims as possibly within exclusion for ―abstract ideas‖ rather than as possibly within exclusion 
for ―mental processes‖). 
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better advance normative goals within those constraints.
216
 And some would largely eliminate 
patentable subject matter limitations, relying on other rules of patent law to separate the 
patentable wheat from the unpatentable chaff.
217
 
A. Threshold Inquiry 
The closest that prior decisions have come to distinguishing the function of patentable 
subject matter from the functions of other patent law doctrines is the characterization of 
patentable subject matter as a ―threshold inquiry‖ or the ―first door‖ an invention must pass 
through in order to get a patent. This image, which appears in decisions of the Supreme Court,
218
 
the Federal Circuit,
219
 and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
220
 suggests a gatekeeper 
                                                     
216 E.g., Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “an Unpatentable Abstract Idea”, supra note 33 (identifying 
multiple distinct meanings of ―abstract idea‖ that raise different concerns and merit different treatment). 
217 E.g., Risch, supra note 2; Osenga, supra note 31.  
218 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (―The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test. Even if an invention 
qualifies as a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, in order to receive the Patent Act's 
protection the claimed invention must also satisfy ‗the conditions and requirements of this title.‘ § 101. Those 
requirements include that the invention be novel, see § 102, nonobvious, see § 103, and fully and particularly 
described, see § 112.‖). 
219 In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (―We do not reach the ground relied on by the Board 
below … because we conclude that many of the claims are ‗barred at the threshold by § 101.‘ It is well-established 
that ‗[t]he first door which must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101.‘ … Only if the 
requirements of § 101 are satisfied is the inventor ‗allowed to pass through to‘ the other requirements for 
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role for patentable subject matter at the point of entry to the patent system, providing a rough 
first cut that leaves some kinds of inventions outside the system while admitting others to be 
examined more closely within the PTO to determine their patentability. Subject matter 
exclusions that may be applied at the front door of the patent system (such as, for example, a rule 
that excludes ―business methods‖ from patentable subject matter) could potentially reduce 
administrative costs of the patent system by restricting the number of patent applications that 
require more costly individualized examination.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
patentability, such as novelty under § 102 and, of pertinence to this case, non-obviousness under § 103.‖); In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950-51 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (―Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter 
under § 101 is a threshold inquiry, and any claim of an application failing the requirements of § 101 must be rejected 
even if it meets all of the other legal requirements of patentability.‖), but cf. id. at 950 n.1 (―Although our decision in 
Comiskey may be misread by some as requiring in every case that the examiner conduct a § 101 analysis before 
assessing any other issue of patentability, we did not so hold. As with any other patentability requirement, an 
examiner may reject a claim solely on the basis of § 101. Or, if the examiner deems it appropriate, she may reject the 
claim on any other ground(s) without addressing § 101. But given that § 101 is a threshold requirement, claims that 
are clearly drawn to unpatentable subject matter should be identified and rejected on that basis. Thus, an examiner 
should generally first satisfy herself that the application's claims are drawn to patent-eligible subject matter.‖). 
220 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 
U.S. 1028 (1980) (―The first door which must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101 …. If the 
invention, as the inventor defines it in his claims … falls into any one of the named categories, he is allowed to pass 
through to the second door, which is § 102; ‗novelty and loss of right to patent‘ is the sign on it.‖). 
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Such a threshold rule is especially attractive if the excluded subject matter either does not 
require the incentive of patent protection or would not get past the additional tests of 
patentability that are administered in the course of examination. On the other hand, to the extent 
that the rule excludes subject matter that might otherwise pass these tests and withholds patents 
from fields that might benefit from patent incentives, it may be criticized as ―eliminating broad 
swaths of innovation with a machete‖ when a more carefully deployed ―scalpel‖ would do a 
better job of promoting progress.
221
 But as Professor Tun-Jen Chiang explains, this tradeoff 
between administrative costs and over- and under-inclusiveness is inherent in the choice of a 
bright-line rule over more discriminating standards.
222
 
A number of problems limit the value of patentable subject matter as a threshold test.  
First, if the threshold test is to provide a useful screen, the exclusions should rest on at least a 
rough assessment of whether patent protection is socially desirable for different categories of 
invention, thereby excluding patents in areas where they are either unnecessary to promote 
innovation or impose monopoly costs that exceed corresponding benefits in the form of 
innovation incentives.
223
 Yet in the absence of systematic investigations of these effects by 
                                                     
221 Risch, supra note 2, at 658; Duffy, supra note 33, at 622-23. 
222 Chiang, supra note 33, at 1357-63. 
223 Olson, supra note 64, at 203 (―[T]he critical first inquiry for the patentability of an invention should be 
whether the invention is within a subject matter area that is subject to a public goods problem such that absent patent 
protection an underproduction of inventions in that subject matter will result.  If a public goods problem exists, then 
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policymakers, judicial exclusions from patentable subject matter rest at best on seat-of-the-pants 
intuitions of jurists from earlier eras. According to Professor David Olson, courts in the past 
―implicitly analyzed‖ the economic effects of patents by subject matter area in developing rules 
that ―distinguish, albeit not explicitly, efficient from inefficient subject matter for 
patentability,‖224 but beginning with the 1980 decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty courts have ―largely abandoned any gatekeeping role‖ in favor of a broad reading 
of statutory standards for patentable subject matter.
225
 But the attribution of implicit economic 
analysis to courts of the past is fraught with possibilities for misunderstanding, projection and 
revisionist history. Moreover, if one trusts that the decisions of judges are guided by economic 
intuitions that they fail to articulate, it is not clear why one would have more confidence in the 
decisions that restricted patentable subject matter in the distant past than in the decisions that 
expanded patentable subject matter in the recent past. Either way, it takes a leap of faith to 
believe that the rules courts devise are smarter than the reasons they adduce in support of those 
rules. The less confidence one has that the rules of patentable subject matter correspond even 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the subject matter should be patentable and the other tests for patentability should be applied.  If no public goods 
problem exists, either because of the nature of the subject matter, or because other factors exist that adequately 
incentive production of the public good, then subject matter patentability should be denied and the patentability 
inquiry should end.‖). 
224 Id. at 205-15. 
225 Id. at 214-15. 
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roughly to the goals of the patent system, the less sense it makes to assign a gatekeeper function 
to those rules. 
Second, in order to provide a means for economizing on administrative costs, patentable 
subject matter exclusions must provide clear rules that can be applied without the need for 
individualized examination. While some exclusions from patentable subject matter have 
provided clear rules for a period of time, such as past exclusions for business methods and living 
things,
226
 often these exclusions have eventually proven to be overinclusive in the face of 
technological change.
227
 Technological change makes categorical exclusions that may have made 
sense in an earlier era seem out of date and unworkable. Thus an exclusion for living things, 
taken for granted as long as that category overlapped substantially with products of nature, 
became anomalous with the advent of genetic engineering,
228
 an exclusion for mathematical 
algorithms became problematic when the advent of computers made the execution of algorithms 
by machine a field of applied technology and incorporated information technology into industrial 
processes,
229
 and an exclusion for business methods became problematic when information 
technology and the internet blurred the boundaries between business and technology.
230
 As 
                                                     
226 Chiang, supra note 33, at 1382-83; Duffy, supra note 33 at 623-38. 
227 Chiang, supra note 33, at 1383-85; Duffy, supra note 33, at 616-17.  
228 Duffy, supra note 33, at 625-32; Eisenberg, supra note 1. 
229 Olson, supra note 64, at 206-18. 
230 Id. at 218-24. 
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Professor John Duffy has documented, bright-line rules have difficulty keeping up with 
technological change, which is especially challenging for a legal regime that functions to 
promote technological change.
231
 Those categorical exclusions that are clear enough to be 
applied by a bouncer at the front door of the PTO may thus become unstable over time. 
Conversely, subject matter exclusions that operate as flexible standards, such as that for 
―abstract ideas,‖ have proven more durable over time, but their meaning is too vague and 
uncertain for them to serve as gatekeepers in a way that economizes on administrative costs.  
Critics of patentable subject matter doctrine cite its lack of clarity relative to other requirements 
for patent protection,
232
 suggesting that administrative efficiency might be better served by 
proceeding directly to individualized examination. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has recognized the 
impracticality of requiring that patentable subject matter determinations precede full examination 
in every case and clarified that, contrary to the implication of the phrase ―threshold test,‖ there is 
                                                     
231 Duffy, supra note 33, at 616 (―[C]hanging conditions present well-known difficulties for rules, and the law 
of patentable subject matter inevitably operates on the ever-changing forefront of human knowledge and 
creativity.‖). 
232 Risch, supra note 2, at 606-07 (―Attention to rigorous application of the patentability standards would 
replace unclear and undefined subject matter rules based on supportable statutory interpretations of the Patent 
Act.‖). 
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no rule that requires that patentable subject matter be considered first when it might be more 
expeditious to dispose of an application on another ground.
233
  
Patentable subject matter also fails to economize on administrative costs when it operates 
as a limitation on allowable claim language and scope rather than as a complete exclusion from 
the patent system. As categorical field exclusions have disappeared, remaining limitations on 
patentable subject matter, such as the exclusions for abstract ideas and natural phenomena, are 
more likely to require careful claim-drafting than to keep an invention from crossing the 
threshold of the PTO. As Professor Chiang explains, the prohibitions on patenting abstract ideas 
and scientific principles are not about excluding certain subject matter from the patent system 
entirely but rather about avoiding unduly broad claims.
234
 Inventors can often respond by 
narrowing their claims, and it requires the attention of an examiner to determine which of the 
claims in a patent application are worded so broadly that they wholly preempt the use of an 
abstract idea or a natural correlation and which are permissibly confined to particular 
applications. Such limitations may be useful as a means of avoiding the allowance of unduly 
broad claims, but they do not serve as threshold tests that economize on administrative costs.   
                                                     
233 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 n.1 (Fed Cir. 2008). 
234 Chiang, supra note 33, at 1385-92 (explaining Supreme Court decisions in O’Reilly v. Morse, The 
Telephone Cases, Funk v. Kalo, and Gottschalk v. Benson as concerned with unduly broad claims). 
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In sum, although one could imagine patentable subject matter serving a useful role as a 
threshold inquiry, economizing on administrative costs by excluding some kinds of subject 
matter from the front door of the patent system without the need for a full examination, 
patentable subject matter doctrine does not and cannot serve that role in its current form. 
B. Limiting heterogeneity 
A different function for patentable subject matter boundaries may be to limit the 
technological diversity of inventions that must be accommodated in a one-size fits all patent 
system.
235 
 By longstanding tradition, now locked in by treaty,
236
 the U.S. patent laws apply 
essentially the same rules of patent law across all fields of technology.
237
 Yet economic research 
                                                     
235 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law & Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
2081, 2084 (2000). 
236 Agreement on Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, Apr.15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 
(commonly known as the TRIPS Agreement), Art. 27, § 1(―[P]atents shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application. … [P]atents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination 
as to … the field of technology ….‖). 
237 Congress has nonetheless sometimes enacted field-specific patent law provisions, including a prior user 
defense against infringement of business method patents, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2010), relief from the nonobviousness 
requirement for certain biotechnology process claims, 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2010), relief from remedies for 
infringement of patents by medical practitioners and related health care entities, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2010), and term 
extensions for drug patents, 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2010).  The recently passed Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. 
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has repeatedly demonstrated that the needs of innovators for patent protection vary significantly 
across fields.
238
 Because of variation in the conditions for innovation, patent rules that provide 
the correct balance between patent incentives and competition in one field are likely to get the 
balance wrong in other fields, providing too much protection in some contexts and too little in 
others. Professor Michael Carroll calls the resulting inefficiencies ―uniformity costs.‖239   
Patentable subject matter boundaries can help to minimize uniformity costs by limiting 
the diversity of innovations that patent law covers, thus making it easier to achieve a more 
optimal level of protection for a narrower range of innovations. The challenge of arriving at rules 
of patent law that satisfy the diverse denizens of the patent system today is visible in the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
L. No. 112-29 (Sept. 16, 2011) extends prior user rights to all fields of technology, id. § 5 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
273) and eliminates special rules for evaluating the nonobviousness of biotechnological processes, id. § 3(c) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103) but has additional field-specific provisions treating tax strategies as prior art, id. § 14, 
providing a transitional period of post-grant review of business method patents, id. § 18, and prohibiting the 
issuance of patents on human organisms, id. § 33,  
238 See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE 
IT (2009) (discussing the economic analysis and rapid changes that have occurred since 2003 in patent reform). 
239 See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All:  A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property 
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Michael W. Carroll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 849 (2006) (defining uniformity cost as ―the distortions caused 
by rights that are more or less robust than necessary to have induced investments in innovation that deliver a net 
benefit to society.‖). 
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divergent positions of different industries concerning patent law reform. Relative newcomers to 
the patent system—mostly from the information technology and service sectors—have favored 
reforms that old-timers such as the pharmaceutical industry have opposed.
240
 New categories of 
patentable subject matter also pose administrative challenges for the PTO, which initially may 
lack the necessary expertise and record of prior art to evaluate patent applications properly in 
new fields.
241
 Perhaps a less diverse community of innovators, maintained through the use of 
patentable subject matter boundaries to exclude newcomers, would more readily agree on what 
the rules should be. 
This picture of the patent system as a gated community, with subject matter boundaries to 
exclude newcomers, invites a number of objections. First, although subject matter boundaries 
may limit uniformity costs for those fields that remain patent eligible, they do nothing to achieve 
the correct balance between incentives and competition for excluded fields. Unless there is 
reason to believe that patent protection is unnecessary for the excluded fields, the resulting 
uneven pattern of protection seems at least as likely to create distortions and inefficiencies as a 
uniform set of rules applied to diverse fields. It seems especially problematic to exclude new 
fields from patent protection, since the development of new technologies may have far greater 
                                                     
240 Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 389 (2007). 
241 See Merges, supra note 64, at 589-91 (1999) (describing initial difficulties for the PTO in examining 
applications in the areas of business methods, biotechnology, and software). 
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social value than incremental improvements in existing fields.
242
 Even a requirement for explicit 
Congressional action to extend patent protection to new fields of technology would add another 
layer of costs and uncertainty to pathbreaking innovations, creating a risk that new technologies 
could get delayed or derailed.  
From a political economy perspective, having diverse interests with a stake in the patent 
system may be advantageous if it provokes vigorous debate about public policy initiatives.  
Otherwise, like-minded firms might encounter little opposition when they lobby for legislative 
changes that are more likely to advance their private interests than to balance competing interests 
in innovation and competition. In other words, uniformity costs from a patent system that seeks 
to regulate diverse interests may be preferable to unchecked rent-seeking in a system that is more 
narrowly tailored to affect concentrated interests.
243
 
                                                     
242 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980) (―[Parker v.] Flook did not announce a new 
principle that inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable 
per se.  To read that concept into Flook would frustrate the purposes of the patent law. This Court frequently has 
observed that a statute is not to be confined to the ‗particular application[s] … contemplated by the legislators.‘ [] 
This is especially true in the field of patent law. A rule that unanticipated inventions are without protection would 
conflict with the core concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability.‖) 
243 WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
(AEI Press 2004), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_Landes.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).  
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Finally, even if patentable subject matter boundaries might be deployed to minimize 
uniformity costs, current patentable subject matter doctrine is not well-suited to that task, for 
essentially the same reasons that it is not well-suited to serve as a gatekeeper at the threshold to 
the patent system. Uniformity calls for field exclusions of a sort that the courts have repeatedly 
rejected, rather than for vague crosscutting standards, such as the exclusion for ―abstract ideas,‖ 
that do not correspond to field distinctions in any apparent way. And of course, if the goal is to 
exclude those fields in which less protection is optimal, it would make sense to engage in policy 
analysis, largely absent in the current system, to identify which fields belong inside and outside 
patentable subject matter boundaries. 
C. Beyond the threshold: public domain, claim scope and building blocks 
Most patentable subject matter decisions that invalidate some claims spare other claims in 
the same patent or application, suggesting that patentable subject matter is functioning as a 
scalpel that determines how inventions may be claimed rather than as a barricade that excludes 
certain categories of invention entirely. Even if patentable subject matter doctrine lacks the 
necessary clarity and field specificity to function as an efficient threshold test, it might still 
provide a useful tool for the PTO and the courts to use in denying or invalidating particular 
patent claims that threaten to impose costs that exceed their benefits. Some scholars have 
suggested that patentable subject matter is redundant to other doctrinal limitations on 
patentability that would support the same outcomes, raising the question of whether it is 
79
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necessary or appropriate to use patentable subject matter limitations to do this work.
244
  But these 
other doctrines may sometimes fail, leaving patentable subject matter limitations as a backstop.  
Doctrinal redundancy is a common feature of legal systems and may make sense if the interest at 
stake is important.  
1. Prior Art 
Some cases about the exclusion of natural products and phenomena of nature from 
patentable subject matter suggest a concern that the claimed invention is largely the handiwork 
of nature, and that the value-added of the inventor is relatively slight. For example, in Funk 
Brothers Seed v. Kalo Inoculant,
245
 the Court held invalid a claim to a mixed culture of bacterial 
strains that were selected by the inventor for their capacity to allow plants to fix nitrogen from 
the environment without inhibiting each other‘s effectiveness. The Court‘s description contrasts 
the wonders of nature with the inventor‘s trivial advance in packaging: 
Bond does not create a state of inhibition or of noninhibition in the bacteria. Their 
qualities are the work of nature. Those qualities are, of course, not patentable. For 
patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature. The qualities 
of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are 
part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws 
of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.  
….  
The aggregation of select strains of the several species into one product is an 
application of that newly discovered natural principle. But however ingenious the 
                                                     
244 E.g., Risch, supra note 2, at 598. 
245 Funk Brothers Seed v. Kalo Inoculant 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
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discovery of that natural principle may have been, the application of it is hardly 
more than an advance in the packaging of the inoculants.  
….  
[O]nce nature's secret of the noninhibitive quality of certain strains of the species 
of Rhizobium was discovered, the state of the art made the production of a mixed 
inoculant a simple step. Even though it may have been the product of skill, it 
certainly was not the product of invention.
246
 
 This analysis does not rest entirely on the exclusion of phenomena of nature from 
patentable subject matter. Indeed it cannot, because the Court concedes that Bond‘s ―aggregation 
of select strains … into one product is an application of that newly discovered natural principle‖ 
rather than a claim to the natural principle itself.
247
  It is difficult to imagine what a claim to the 
natural principle itself would look like or what it would mean. As Professor Collins explains, 
On its face, this prohibition on claiming unapplied natural principles and the like 
might seem simply to mean that Einstein cannot claim E=mc
2
 itself and Newton 
cannot claim the universal law of gravitation itself. However, the doctrine of 
patent eligibility would not be needed to keep such direct claims to newly 
discovered principles, truths, or laws out of the patent regime. They are patent 
gibberish. Patent claims describing ―the state of affairs in which E=mc2‖ are 
malformed in that they don‘t describe a set of things or processes at all.248 
The ground for invalidation of Bond‘s claim to the mixed culture seems to be as much about the 
obviousness of the inventor‘s aggregation of strains (―a simple step … not the product of 
invention‖)249 as it is about the exclusion of the phenomena of nature from patentability.   
                                                     
246 Id. at 130-32 (citations omitted). 
247 Id. 
248 Collins, supra note 33 at 56-57. 
249 Funk Bros. Seed, 333 U.S. at 132. 
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Essential to the Court‘s conclusion that the mixed culture was ―not the product of 
invention‖ is its treatment of the newly discovered properties of the bacteria as ―part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men.‖250  In effect, the Court treats Bond‘s discovery of 
noninhibitive strains as if that much of his contribution were prior art, and concludes that the 
further step of combining those strains in a mixed culture was nothing more than the exercise of 
―ordinary skill.‖ Prior251 and subsequent252 cases have taken a similar approach, treating 
excluded subject matter as if it were prior art in evaluating the patentability of the claimed 
invention. This approach seems to have one foot in the doctrine of patentable subject matter and 
the other in prior art doctrines such as novelty and nonobviousness.   
Judge Giles Rich, one of the principal architects of the 1952 Patent Act, criticized this 
approach as fundamentally confused in an opinion for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
                                                     
250 Id. at 130. 
251 E.g., O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 115 (quoting with approval the following passage from the decision in 
Neilson and others v. Harford and others in the English Court of Exchequer:  ―[T]he plaintiff does not merely claim 
a principle, but a machine, embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must be considered as 
if the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode of applying it by a mechanical apparatus to 
furnaces ….‖). 
252 E.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978) (―Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown 
at the time of the claimed invention, as one of the ‗basic tools of scientific and technological work,‘ it is treated as 
though it were a familiar part of the prior art.‖) (citation omitted). 
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in the case of In re Bergy that borders on insubordination.
253
 The Supreme Court had vacated and 
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Parker v. Flook.254 
Judge Rich took the opportunity instead to criticize the Supreme Court‘s approach, stating that 
―we find in Flook an unfortunate and apparently unconscious, though clear, commingling of 
distinct statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated, namely, those pertaining to the 
categories of inventions in § 101 which may be patentable and to the conditions for patentability 
demanded by the statute for inventions within the statutory categories, particularly the 
nonobviousness condition of § 103….‖255 Focusing on the statement in Flook ―that a 
‗mathematical algorithm‘ or formula is like a law of nature in that it is one of the ‗basic tools of 
scientific and technological work‘ and as such must be deemed to be ‗a familiar part of the prior 
art,‘ even when it was not familiar, was not prior, was discovered by the applicant for patent, was 
novel at the time he discovered it, and was useful,‖ Judge Rich warned that ―[t]his gives to the 
term ‗prior art,‘ which is a very important term of art in patent law, particularly in the application 
of § 103, an entirely new dimension with consequences of unforeseeable magnitude.‖256 
                                                     
253 596 F.2d 952, 959 (CCPA 1979). 
254 In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (CCPA 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). 
255 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
256 Id. at 965-66 (emphasis in original).  If the Court‘s approach represented a departure from the scheme of 
the Patent Act at the time, Congress more recently appears to be following the Court‘s lead by providing for the 
treatment of ―any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether known or unknown at the time 
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Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from the approach of treating 
natural products and phenomena as prior art. In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court even cited Judge 
Rich‘s opinion in Bergy with approval for the proposition that the question of whether a 
particular invention meets the test of novelty under § 102 is ―wholly apart from whether the 
invention falls into a category of patentable subject matter.‖257 Yet the Court has never explicitly 
overruled the approach of the prior decisions, and in Bilski v. Kappos the Court quoted the same 
passage from Parker v. Flook that Judge Rich had criticized in Bergy without expressing any 
disapproval.
258
 
Some scholars have responded to the recent revival of patentable subject matter 
limitations by arguing that subject matter exclusions are redundant to other limitations on what 
may be patented, including those based on prior art. Professor Michael Risch argues that cases 
like Parker v. Flook could be resolved through rigorous application of prior art doctrines without 
the need for murky rules concerning patentable subject matter,
259
 while Professor Kristen Osenga 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of the invention or application for patent,‖ as if it were a part of the prior art in evaluating inventions for 
patentability.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 §14,(a) (Sept. 16, 2011).  
257 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1980) (citing In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 961). 
258 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 1330 (―The Court concluded that the process at issue there was ‗unpatentable under § 
101, not because it contain[ed] a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm [wa]s 
assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contain[ed] no patentable invention.‘‖) 
(citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594). 
259 Risch, supra note 2, at 598-609. 
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criticizes the PTO and courts for use of subject matter exclusions as ―proxies for other difficult 
questions of patentability and policy.‖260 
 However, it is not at all clear that existing prior art doctrine on its own would provide an 
alternative basis for the holdings that the Supreme Court arrived at through its patentable subject 
matter jurisprudence.  The Patent Act itemizes the available categories of prior art in § 102.
261
 
Each of the categories listed in the statute identifies a prior source of human knowledge with no 
mention of products or phenomena of nature that have not yet come to the attention of humans.  
Section 102 thus precludes the patenting of an invention if it was previously known or used by 
others,
262
 patented or described in a printed publication,
263
 in public use or on sale,
264
 disclosed 
in a co-pending patent application,
265
 and so forth.  Products and phenomena of nature would 
                                                     
260 Osenga, supra note 31, at 1115-23. 
261 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (―[I]n 1952 Congress voiced its intent to consider the 
novelty of an invention under § 102 where it is first made clear what the statute means by ‗new‘, notwithstanding the 
fact that this requirement is first named in § 101.‖).  The same list determines the sources of prior art for evaluating 
the nonobviousness of an invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2010).  Hazeltine Research v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 
255-56 (1965) (§ 102(e)); In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (§ 102(b)); In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 
1287 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (§ 102(g)); Oddzon Products v. Just Toys, 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (§102(f)). 
262 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2010). 
263 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a) - (b) (2010). 
264 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2010). 
265 35 U.S.C. § 102 (e) (2010). 
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seem to count as prior art only to the extent that they fall into one of the categories listed in § 
102. In other words, without assistance from the doctrine of patentable subject matter, newly 
discovered products and phenomena of nature do not seem to qualify as prior art under § 102 
alone.
266
   
In a challenge to the validity of patents on isolated and purified DNA sequences, 
Professor Oskar Liivak has argued that patent claims to products isolated from nature violate a 
Constitutional requirement of originality, codified at § 102(f) in a provision that precludes the 
issuance of a patent if the applicant ―did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be 
patented.‖267 This provision is generally understood to prohibit the patenting of an invention by 
one who derived it from someone else.
268
 Professor Liivak believes that the same limitation 
                                                     
266 But cf. Collins, supra note 33, at 57 (arguing that claims to phenomena of nature ―would be 
inherently anticipated under section 102, as the states of affairs described by the claims long predated their 
discovery by humankind.‖). 
267 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2010); see Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitutional 
Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 261 (2005). This provision will be eliminated for 
claims with an effective filing date after March 16, 2013 under § 3 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29 (Sept. 16, 2011).. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 
available at http://www.patentlyo.com/files/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf (visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
268 See Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (―To show 
derivation, the party asserting invalidity must prove both prior conception of the invention by another and 
communication of that conception to the patentee.‖). 
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applies (or should apply) to inventions that are derived from nature.
269
 Moreover, consistent with 
the approach of the Supreme Court, he would count material derived from nature as prior art in 
evaluating the obviousness of inventions that have been modified through human intervention.
270
 
But there is little authority to support this interpretation of current law; indeed, none of the four 
judges—three on the Federal Circuit and one on the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York—who considered the patent eligibility of claims to isolated and purified DNA 
sequences in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
271
 even 
mentioned derivation or § 102(f), resting instead on §101 and cases excluding products of nature 
from patentable subject matter. 
In sum, although some patentable subject matter decisions concerning products and 
phenomena of nature appear to rest in part on considerations of novelty, originality, and 
nonobviousness that find expression elsewhere in the Patent Act, prevailing interpretations of 
these other statutory provisions do not make these subject matter limitations redundant.  Instead, 
to the extent that the patentable subject matter cases remain good law, they seem to go beyond 
the definitions of prior art in the statute and case law to exclude newly discovered natural 
products and phenomena, and obvious variations of them, from patent protection. 
                                                     
269 Liivak, supra note 267, at 265. 
270 Id. at 291-92 (citing Oddzon Products v. Just Toys, 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
271 Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS) 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (2010), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).   
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2. Claim Scope 
Many patentable subject matter cases reflect a concern that the invalidated claims are 
unduly broad. An early example is O’Reilly v. Morse,272 in which the Supreme Court held invalid 
the eighth claim of a patent to Samuel Morse on his invention of the telegraph machine: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery 
described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention 
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call 
electromagnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible 
characters, signs or letters at any distances, being a new application of that power, 
of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
273
 
In invalidating this claim, the Court stressed that its broad scope would give Morse control over 
future advances yet to be made by others.274 The Court worried that Morse could dominate future 
advances without having to seek additional patent rights, and therefore without providing further 
disclosure: 
[T]he patentee would be able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties 
and powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might bring to light. … 
                                                     
272 O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).  
273 Id. at 112. 
274 Id. at 113 (―If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the result is 
accomplished. For aught that we now know, some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a 
mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the 
process or combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification. … But yet if it is covered by this patent, the inventor 
could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it, without the permission of this patentee.‖) 
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And if he can secure the exclusive use by his present patent, he may vary it with 
every new discovery and development of the science, and need place no 
description of the new manner, process, or machinery upon the records of the 
patent office.…In fine, he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process 
which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not 
describe when he obtained his patent. The court is of opinion that the claim is too 
broad, and not warranted by law.
275
 
The Court‘s repeated observation that the eighth claim extends beyond the specific means 
disclosed by Morse in his specification
276
 suggests to some commentators that the best way to 
understand the holding is that the eighth claim was not properly enabled by the disclosure.
277
 Yet 
the opinion also recites that ―the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical 
science is not patentable,‖278 and subsequent cases have cited O’Reilly v. Morse as authority for 
the exclusion of fundamental principles and abstract ideas from patentable subject matter.
279
 
 A similar concern with claim scope appears in many subsequent cases invalidating 
particular claims as drawn to fundamental principles and abstract ideas. For example, the 
Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson observed that the claim it held invalid for lack of 
patentable subject matter was ―so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown 
                                                     
275 Id. at 113. 
276 Id. at 118-21. 
277 See Risch, supra note 2, at 600-01; Duffy, supra note 33, at 641-42 (citing late 19th century sources). 
278 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 116. 
279 E.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972); 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978). 
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uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion‖ and that ―the patent would wholly pre-empt the 
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.‖280 This 
theme reappears in Bilski v. Kappos, in which the Supreme Court notes that ―[a]llowing 
petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would 
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.‖281   
The Federal Circuit has also used patentable subject matter doctrine to invalidate broad 
claims. For example, in its 1989 decision in In re Grams,
282
 the Federal Circuit upheld a rejection 
for lack of patentable subject matter of an astonishingly broad claim to ―a method of diagnosing 
an abnormal condition in an individual‖ by performing clinical laboratory tests, comparing the 
parameter values for the individual with reference values, and determining whether there are any 
abnormalities.
283
 The Federal Circuit held that the claim was improperly drawn to a 
                                                     
280 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68. 
281 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
282 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
283 The full claim reads:  ―1.  A method of diagnosing an abnormal condition in an individual, the individual 
being characterized by a plurality of correlated parameters of a set of such parameters that is representative of the 
individual's condition, the parameters comprising data resulting from a plurality of clinical laboratory tests which 
measure the levels of chemical and biological constituents of the individual [sic] and each parameter having a 
reference range of values, the method comprising [a] performing said plurality of clinical laboratory tests on the 
individual to measure the values of the set of parameters; [b] producing from the set of measured parameter values 
and the reference ranges of values a first quantity representative of the condition of the individual; [c] comparing the 
90
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mathematical algorithm, noting that although the claim refers to the performance of clinical tests, 
the patent disclosure ―does not bulge with disclosure about those tests, and indeed the 
specification states that ‗the invention is applicable to any complex system, whether it be 
electrical, mechanical, chemical or biological, or combinations thereof.‘‖284 The court concluded 
that ―applicants are, in essence, claiming the mathematical algorithm, which they cannot do 
under Gottschalk v. Benson. The presence of a physical step in the claim to derive data for the 
algorithm will not render the claim statutory.‖285 
 In each of these cases the courts see the breadth of the claim as indicating that it is not 
limited to a particular application of the principle/idea/algorithm, but reaches beyond that 
application to claim the principle/idea/algorithm itself. In other words, claim scope is what 
                                                                                                                                                                           
first quantity to a first predetermined value to determine whether the individual's condition is abnormal; [d] upon 
determining from said comparing that the individual's condition is abnormal, successively testing a plurality of 
different combinations of the constituents of the individual by eliminating parameters from the set to form subsets 
corresponding to said combinations, producing for each subset a second quantity, and comparing said second 
quantity with a second predetermined value to detect a non-significant deviation from a normal condition; and [e] 
identifying as a result of said testing a complementary subset of parameters corresponding to a combination of 
constituents responsible for the abnormal condition, said complementary subset comprising the parameters 
eliminated from the set so as to produce a subset having said non-significant deviation from a normal condition.‖ Id. 
at 836-37 (emphasis and alteration appear in decision). 
284 Id. at 840. 
285 Id. 
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distinguishes an unpatentable principle/idea/algorithm from its patent-eligible particular 
applications.
286
 
 If the problem with the claims in these cases is that they are unduly broad, arguably the 
statutory grounds for invalidity should be failure of enablement under § 112 of the Patent Act
287
 
rather than lack of patentable subject matter under of § 101 of the Patent Act. But enablement 
doctrine hardly offers any clearer or more predictable tools than patentable subject matter for 
discerning the allowable scope of patent claims. Although some judicial decisions say that claim 
scope must be commensurate with the scope of embodiments that have been enabled by the 
patent disclosure,
288
 others say that the requirement of an enabling disclosure is satisfied if the 
specification provides an enabling disclosure of a single embodiment falling within the scope of 
a claim.
289
 Patent claims must extend beyond the particular disclosed embodiments in order to 
                                                     
286 Cf. Collins, supra note 33, at 50 (noting that one possible meaning of ―an unpatentable abstract idea‖ 
relates to abstraction or generality in the claim language itself). 
287 § 112 provides: ―The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same ….‖ 35 U.S.C. § 112 
(2010). 
288 E.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs, Inc., 429 F.3d 
1052, 1070-71 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
289 E.g., Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc. 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Engel Industries, Inc. v. 
Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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have any value, and enablement doctrine offers inconsistent guidance about how far beyond 
those embodiments a claim may reach.
290
   
Particularly problematic for enablement doctrine are claims that cover future 
embodiments using technologies that have yet to be invented as of the filing date. Some 
decisions say that such claims fail the test of enablement, reasoning that as of the filing date it 
would have required undue experimentation to make the future embodiments,
291
 but other 
decisions have upheld similar claims, reasoning that the original specification disclosed at least 
one mode of making and using the invention, even though it did not disclose the later 
                                                     
290 For thoughtful analyses of the doctrine, see Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
523, 535-38 (2010) (discussing contradictions that arise from current enablement doctrine); Tun-Jen Chiang, The 
Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1353, 1368-72 (2010) (examining 
conflicting case law on contemporary enablement doctrine and doctrinal confusion arising form choosing the level 
of abstraction to define patent protection); Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. 
L. 1083 (2009) (characterizing contemporary enablement doctrine as ―chaotic‖ and proposing different rules); 
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1141 (2008) (arguing that written description requirement compensates for indeterminacy of enablement standard). 
291 E.g., Plant Genetic Systems v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that patent 
claims to a plant cell transformed with a DNA fragment were not fully enabled where the specification taught how 
to transform dicot plants but not monocot plants, and existing technology as of filing date did not provide such a 
method for monocots). 
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technology.
292
 Some decisions insist that the disclosure must enable the ―full scope‖ of the patent 
claims without undue experimentation,
293
 yet others hold that ―a broad claim may be enabled by 
disclosure of a single embodiment.‖294 Determining the validity of prior claims that dominate 
later-developed technologies presents a difficult choice about how best to allocate incentives 
between earlier and later inventors. With competing lines of authority available to justify 
different outcomes, enablement fails to provide useful guidance to courts or examiners in making 
that fundamental policy choice.   
In recent years the Federal Circuit has provided an additional constraint on claim scope in 
the form of a fortified requirement for a ―written description‖ of the invention that is distinct 
from the requirement of enablement.
295
 This somewhat controversial development has been 
                                                     
292 See., e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 314 F.3d 1313, 1334-37 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that 
patent claim to vertebrate cells with DNA control sequences for producing erythropoietin was adequately enabled by 
disclosure of examples using transformed Chinese hamster ovary and monkey cells yet also covered later technology 
using endogenous activation of erythropoietin in human cells). 
293 Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (―[T]o be enabling, the 
specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed 
invention without ‗undue experimentation.‘‖) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
294 Spectra-Physics v. Coherent, 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  
295 See Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Univ. of Rochester v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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particularly important in limiting the scope of claims in biopharmaceutical patents,
296
 and has 
arguably eclipsed enablement doctrine as a limitation on claim scope.
297
    
Patentable subject matter provides another backstop to the indeterminate doctrine of 
enablement for limiting the scope of claims arising out of discoveries of fundamental principles 
or natural phenomena. Such claims raise special concerns for the patent system for two reasons. 
First, fundamental principles and natural phenomena are likely to be especially important to the 
work of future innovators, and promoting future innovation is a primary goal of patent law.  
Second, newly discovered fundamental principles and natural phenomena may face few 
constraints from prior art, which is ordinarily an important determinant of allowable claim 
scope.
298
   
Understood as a limitation on claim scope rather than as an exclusion of entire fields 
from patent protection, this exclusion provides a principle for limiting the scope of claims that 
                                                     
296 See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to 
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617 (1998); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Biotechnology:  Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834-35 (1999); Margaret Sampson, 
The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of 
Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1262 (2000). 
297 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In this case, the district 
court held claims to be invalid for lack of both enablement and written description. The Federal Circuit affirmed on 
written description alone, without reaching enablement. 
298 See Chiang, supra note 290, at 535. 
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might otherwise be quite broad and impose social costs that are quite high. Like the doctrine of 
enablement, this exclusion balances the interests of prior innovators against those of subsequent 
innovators. But while enablement directs attention towards determining the range of 
embodiments that the patent disclosure puts within easy reach of those skilled in the art, the 
patentable subject matter exclusion directs attention towards determining which aspects of the 
discovery must remain in the public domain to encourage future innovation. Both determinations 
present difficult line-drawing problems and would benefit from clearer policy guidance. 
3.  Basic tools of scientific and technological work 
A recurring mantra in many judicial opinions about patentable subject matter is that 
excluded subject matter constitutes ―basic tools‖ of scientific or technological work.299 The 
Supreme Court even recited this mantra in Bilski v. Kappos, declaring that business methods are 
―the basic tools of commercial work‖ and, ―in many cases, the basic tools of further business 
innovation.‖300 But taken this far, the ―basic tools‖ concept would seem to cover every step in the 
course of incremental innovation in any field, and thus fails to explain distinctions between 
patentable and excluded subject matter. 
                                                     
299 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo 
Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d at 1353-54; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952; In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 979; Ass‘n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 at *104. 
300 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3255. 
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Perhaps the relationship between homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiency in 
Laboratory Corporation of American Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories makes a better poster 
child for the ―basic tools‖ argument than the risk-hedging method in Bilski v. Kappos.  Justice 
Breyer explains in his Laboratory Corporation dissent that the exclusion of ―laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas‖ from patentable subject matter preserves free access to 
―fundamental building blocks‖ that are likely to be of value in many future research paths, thus 
preventing patents from obstructing future research.
301
 While conceding that ―the category of 
non-patentable ‗phenomena of nature,‘ like the categories of ‗mental processes,‘ and ‗abstract 
intellectual concepts,‘ is not easy to define,‖ Justice Breyer concluded ―[t]here can be little doubt 
that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a 
‗natural phenomenon.‘‖302 
The line-drawing problems may be more difficult than Justice Breyer recognizes.  
Professor Allen Yu argues that the traditional exclusions from patentable subject matter for 
natural phenomena and products may no longer correspond as closely to the ―basic tools of 
scientific and technological work‖ as they did in the past, given that ―[m]uch of biomedical 
know-how today is based on discoveries about basic workings of the human body.
303
  He 
explains that ―[a]lmost all medical interventions involve restoring or mimicking nature, not 
                                                     
301 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 126-28. 
302 Id. at 135. 
303 Yu, supra note 33, at 395. 
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replacing or improving nature.‖304 In this environment, robust subject matter exclusions based on 
a distinction between what is ―natural‖ and what is ―man-made‖ seem to rest on ―ungrounded 
legalistic and semantics-based arguments‖ rather than on sound policy considerations.305  
Professor Yu proposes as one of several alternatives that the Court replace its relatively weak 
prohibition against the patenting of nature and abstract ideas with ―a stronger, more explicit 
prohibition against the patenting of ‗basic tools of scientific and technological work,‘‖ assessed 
from the perspective of a ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ or ―PHOSITA.‖306 Professor 
Yu predicts that a PHOSITA would not consider a test for homocysteine to detect vitamin 
deficiency to be a basic tool of scientific and technological work, but would consider genes to be 
unpatentable under this standard.
307 
While recognizing that this standard is no easier to apply 
than the distinction between what is natural and what is man-made, Professor Yu nonetheless 
argues that his standard is superior because it ―focuses on articulating the costs of patents.‖308  
Less salient in this approach are the benefits of patents, such as the social value of the incentives 
they provide for commercial product development, which ought to be weighed against these 
costs to achieve an efficient balance. Many inventions are simultaneously both basic tools of 
scientific and technological work and commercial technologies that may be put to immediate 
                                                     
304 Id. at 400-01. 
305 Id. at 401. 
306 Id. at 428-29. 
307 Id. at 429-30. 
308 Id. at 430. 
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practical use in the diagnosis and treatment of disease. Withholding patents to keep basic tools in 
the public domain may thus simultaneously withhold incentives for new medical interventions, 
posing a stark conflict between avoiding the costs and securing the benefits of patents. 
If the goal of withholding patents on basic tools of scientific and technological work is to 
provide a clear field for future researchers to make unfettered use of these tools, perhaps an 
exclusion from patentable subject matter is not the best doctrinal approach. An alternative that 
might be less destructive of incentives to develop new medical interventions would be to give 
researchers an infringement exemption, while leaving patent holders with patents that they could 
assert against providers of new medical interventions. Regrettably, U.S. law has done almost 
exactly the opposite: the Federal Circuit has restricted the scope of the common law research 
exemption from infringement liability,
309
 while Congress has provided a statutory exemption 
from patent infringement remedies for medical practitioners and related health care entities.
310
   
                                                     
309 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (unauthorized use of a patented invention 
in noncommercial academic research furthers the university‗s ―legitimate business objectives, including educating 
and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects‖ and therefore ―does not qualify for the very 
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense‖).  A separate statutory defense originally designed for generic 
drug manufacturers exempts the use of an invention ―solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products.‖ 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2010).  This shelters some uses of patented inventions in 
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A policy of promoting unfettered access to the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work does not provide a fully coherent account of patentable subject matter doctrine, and it is not 
clear that exclusions from patentable subject matter are the best way to advance that policy. But 
it is as coherent a story as the courts have offered on the topic of patentable subject matter. The 
repeated references to ―basic tools of scientific and technological work‖ in judicial opinions 
about patentable subject matter suggest a policy interest that might explain past decisions and 
guide future decisions about the scope of those exclusions. But there is little evidence in the 
opinions that the courts take this interest seriously. Instead the words appear inside quotation 
marks in paragraphs full of string citations, as part of a formal homage to prior decisions rather 
than as an analytical tool for resolving current controversies at the frontiers of patentable subject 
matter. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court has created a state of high uncertainty as to the rules of patentable 
subject matter. By directing the lower courts to seek guidance from its own prior decisions 
without actually explaining the policies served by patentable subject matter doctrine, it demands 
formal adherence to the principle of stare decisis without following the discipline of common 
law reasoning. Many cases speak of patentable subject matter as a threshold test at the front door 
                                                                                                                                                                           
biopharmaceutical research that is directed towards new drug development.  See Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).  
310 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2010).   
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of the patent system, but current doctrine lacks the necessary clarity to function as an initial 
screen prior to full examination. Although field exclusions from patentable subject matter might 
in the past have limited the heterogeneity of inventions covered by patent law, field exclusions 
have largely been repudiated by the courts, leaving vaguely worded exclusions that are as 
challenging to interpret and apply as any other standards for patentability. Some cases, 
particularly those asserting the unpatentability of natural phenomena and fundamental principles, 
have called for treating discoveries about the natural world as if they were already in the public 
domain, an approach that is sometimes criticized for conflating subject matter limitations with 
doctrines concerning prior art and disclosure.  But patentable subject matter limitations are not 
redundant to these other doctrines.  Patentable subject matter offers an additional tool for 
limiting the scope of patents that might otherwise unduly impede future research.  Language in 
patentable subject matter opinions about ―basic tools of scientific and technological research‖ 
hints at a policy justification for this approach that is not fully examined, although it is 
consistently quoted approvingly. Perhaps these cases have wisdom to offer that could guide 
courts today in adapting patentable subject matter doctrine to inventions at the current forefronts 
of technology. But in the absence of a more careful judicial account of the role of patentable 
subject matter to guide modern courts in channeling the wisdom of their predecessors, continued 
adherence to these prior decisions seems instead like a form of dead-hand control.  By 
reasserting its precedents as binding authority without explaining them, the Supreme Court 
compounded this problem in Bilski v. Kappos.  In future decisions, it might do better to begin by 
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distinguishing the function of patentable subject matter limitations from the functions served by 
other requirements for patent protection. 
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